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## CHARITABLE TRUSTS, ANCIENT AND MODERN.

MOST of our readers are, of course, aware that almost all the property applied to the purposes of the Catholic religion in this country is held by persons in trust for such purposes; and these trusts are in general terms called Charitable Trusts. Consequently no subject could be more important to the Catholic Church in England than the administration of these trusts; and for years past—in fact, ever since they became legal in their character—the subject has been one of anxious consideration to the bishops, and has given rise to many painful disputes. There have been repeated efforts to obtain legislation on the question; some on the part of the friends, and some by the enemies of the Church. Last session an attempt of the latter character was made in the bill brought in by Sir F. Thesiger, the attorney-general of Lord Derby's government and the counsel for Dr. Achilli. This measure was neither more nor less than one of wholesale confiscation for Catholic religious trusts, by casting them into Chancery. Happily, although it was supported by Mr. Chisholm Anstey, it was so well opposed by Mr. Monsell, Mr. Moore, and other zealous Catholics in and out of parliament, especially by one who is now, we rejoice to say, in parliament (we mean Dr. Bowyer), that it was defeated. Already, however, notice of a question has been given on the part of Mr. Anstey's colleague and coadjutor in many pious anti-Catholic labours, as to whether the present government intend to bring in some measure on this subject; and whatever may be the answer, it is pretty plain that ultimately the question must come before parliament. It is of the utmost importance, therefore, that it should be well understood; and we are persuaded that it is not well understood, nor indeed understood at all, by a large class of Catholics. For this reason we propose to attempt its

elucidation in a plain historical way, tracing from the earliest periods the history of Catholic religious trusts, and shewing how they were administered, and under what authority, and how far they have ever been deemed not of legal but of spiritual cognisance; our special object being to negative the claim set up by the secular courts to have cognisance of them, and to shew that never in this country, down to the present period, have they been under exclusively temporal administration, and that until the Reformation they were under an exclusively spiritual administration.

We shall first, in the present article, trace the history of religious trusts down to the era of the Revolution, when Catholics were precluded from holding lands at all; and afterwards consider the history of the law as to Protestant trusts since the same era.

In the primitive times the bishop was the sole dispenser of the goods of the Church, by the hands of the deacons. In the Apostolical Constitutions it is said, "It is for you, O laymen, to contribute liberally; it is for the bishop, as the steward and administrator of ecclesiastical matters, to dispense. Beware lest you wish to call the bishop to account; and do not watch his dispensation, in what manner he expends it, or when, or to whom, or whether well or otherwise; for he has God to call him to account, who hath delivered this procuratorial office into his hands, and deigned to commit to him this great sacerdotal dignity." And in strict conformity with the spirit of this language, we find St. Cyril of Alexandria protesting against an attempt to call bishops to account. But, as Thomassinus truly states, while the bishop had the sole dispensing power, he was bound to follow the canonical law of dispensation, or he might be summoned to answer before the metropolitan; and *he* again was, of course, subject to the Holy See. It is easy to shew that similar principles were enforced at the foundation of the Catholic Church in this country. Thus we read in Bede, that Pope Gregory wrote to St. Augustine, "Bishop of the Church of Canterbury," in the sixth century: "It is the custom of the Apostolic See to prescribe rules to bishops newly ordained, that all emoluments which accrue are to be divided into four portions; one for the bishop and his household, because of hospitality and entertainment; another for the clergy; a third for the poor; and the fourth for the repair of churches. As for those who live in community, why need we say any thing of hospitality and mercy, as all that can be spared is to be spent in pious and religious works?" The same principles can be traced throughout



the Anglo-Saxon laws. It was among the ecclesiastical canons, enacted under Edgar and Edmund, that "the priests so distribute the people's alms as that they do both give pleasure to God and accustom the people to alms; and that no dispute between priests be referred to the adjustment of secular men, but let them adjust it among their own companions, or refer to the bishop, if that be needful." In the tenth century Edgar made an appeal to the bishops and abbots to repress abuses which prevailed; stating, that he bore the sword of Constantine, they that of St. Peter; that his care was to provide for their due support and subsistence,—theirs to enforce good discipline. "It is for you to see that they are careful in the performance of their rule."\*

Nothing is more clear than that originally, according to the law and constitution of this country, the secular courts had no cognisance of what was spiritual; and "uses," in their own nature, being the possession of property in trust and confidence, were matters merely of conscience, and so spiritual. Hence in the most ancient law-book in our language, the *Mirror of Justice*, originally written in the time of Alfred, and edited in the reign of Edward I., it is declared at the outset, that "the law was divided into canon law, which consisteth in the amendment of spiritual offences by admonition, prayers, reproofs, and excommunication; and the written law, which consisteth in the punishing of temporal offences;"† and it is added, "of the spiritual law the prelates judged, and lay princes of the other law." And among the instances afterwards given of obligations of which the temporal law took no cognisance, is this case: "If I devise in my will that you shall sell some of my tenements to pay my debts, or to do other things with the money, and you keep the money to your own use;"‡ language which, of course, equally includes uses spiritual or secular; and in both cases it is recognised as the law of England, that the temporal courts could not enforce. The reason given, though not clearly expressed, is perfectly intelligible; it was this, that it was a question mainly of bad faith (in the old French, "*entremellure de male foy*"), i. e. the parties had not contemplated responsibility to the secular courts; the receiver had only contracted morally, not legally, but so as to bind his conscience. This distinction is drawn in all our ancient laws, and recognised by the commentators upon them. Thus Bracton, writing in the reign of Henry III., lays it down, that to the spiritual courts pertain matters spi-

\* Maccabe's Catholic History, vol. ii. p. 561.

† Mirror of Justice, ch. i. sec. 1.

‡ Ibid. ch. ii. sec. 27.

ritual or annexed to spiritualities;\* and by his definition of a trust distinguishes it from a condition or a contract, and excludes it from the cognisance of the secular courts. As an illustration of this distinction between conditions and trusts, we may mention that, in the reign of Edward I., a celebrated statute passed to reaffirm the principle declared in the laws of Alfred and Henry I., as to what in modern language is called entailed estates, and reciting in very remarkable words, that it "seemeth very hard to the givers and their heirs that their will, being expressed in the gift, was not nor is observed;" and then enacting, "that the will of the giver, according to the form in the deed of gift expressed, shall be from henceforth observed." And as the donor clearly intended that if the object of his gift failed, the land should revert to him or his heirs, the secular courts took cognisance of and enforced this purely temporal right.

Of course, it was very different in the case of property conveyed to pious uses, where, however express the trust, the object was purely spiritual; and so the execution of it was considered exclusively of ecclesiastical cognisance. We cannot collect any cases of this character from the early laws or records of the country, but may infer from the passage already cited out of the *Mirror* that they existed, and that parties did sometimes leave or give lands, or money, expressly for the purpose of particular religious uses, as saying masses, giving alms, and so forth. Indeed Glanville, in the reign of Henry III., alludes to persons "leaving land to any one in remuneration of his services" (which might of course be services spiritual, as singing *requiem* for the repose of his soul); but he adds, "or to a religious house, as free alms;" and Bracton explains this as a technical legal phrase, denoting that land so given "to churches, cathedrals, conventual or parochial, or to religious houses," was held by them perpetually for purely spiritual services.† And in the reign of Edward I. an act of parliament recited "that religious houses were founded that alms and other charitable deeds might be done, and prayers offered for the souls of the founders and their heirs;"‡ and again, in the reign of Henry V., an act recited that they were founded "by lords and ladies," "to the honour of God and His glorious Mother, in aid, and to the merit, of the souls of the said founders."§ So that the object of these donations was purely spiritual, and the performance of the services of

\* Bracton, lib. v. c. 2; lib. iii. ch. 1, 2.

† Ibid. lib. ii. c. 10.

‡ Stat. 35, Edward I., *de asportatis religiosorum*.

§ Stat. 2, Henry V. c. i.



purely spiritual cognisance, not constituting even legal uses or "trusts;" the founders not having contemplated any pecuniary benefit, or any control by the courts secular. Yet, from the establishment of the Norman dynasty in the country, the crown manifested a constant anxiety to bring the property of religious houses under the control of the secular tribunals; under pretence of the founders' heirs having a legal pecuniary interest in the due discharge of the duties of prayer and almsgiving and other charitable works for the benefit of their souls. This constitutes the first era in the history of Charitable Trusts.\*

Thus, although Bracton in his great work, which Coke refers to as of the highest authority, carefully distinguishes the case of land given on condition of some secular service or advantage; in which case he lays it down, that if the condition be not observed, the land reverts to the donor† (a doctrine quite in conformity with the law as declared in the ancient code of Alfred); he carefully distinguishes this case from the case of land given (as Glanville and he define it) "in free alms" (*liberam eleemosynam*), of which he treats in a distinct section; and not only says nothing of the land reverting to the donor or his heirs if the alms be not performed, but rather implies the reverse, by laying it down that the land is held perpetually, and the very phrase 'free alms' indicates the absence of legal obligation.‡ Notwithstanding this, in the reign of Edward I. it is not only enacted that if religious houses alienated the lands given them, the donors' heirs might recover them; but that if land given for a chantry, "light in a church, or sustenance of poor people, or other alms to be done or maintained, be withdrawn, an action shall lie for the donor or his heirs to recover the lands,"§—an action utterly unheard of at common law, and for which a special statute and a new original writ was now framed.

The hypocrisy of such a statute as this was most intense; for in the same reign it was recited, on the king's accession,|| that houses of religion have been "overcharged and sore grieved by the resort of great men and others, so that they have been impoverished and unable to maintain such charity as they have been accustomed to." Thus one act shews that the "lords" robbed the religious houses so as to prevent their performance of their usual works of charity; and another shews that the same "lords" were eager to seize their lands by way of penalty for the compulsory poverty their own rapacity had produced. And yet Protestant writers talk of the rapacity

\* See series of papers in *Rambler*, 1851—Encroachments of the State, &c.

† Lib. ii. c. 6.    ‡ Lib. ii. c. 10.    § 13 Ed. I. c. 11.    || 1 Ed. I.



of the clergy, and their "swallowing up the lands of the country!" In pursuance of precisely the same policy, an act is passed in the same reign,\* interfering with the proper control of the temporalities of the religious houses by their foreign superiors, but still recognising the right of these superiors to exercise control on spiritualities. So in the reign of Henry V. an act is passed, directing that the bishops should (by the king's commission in cases of royal patronage) inquire into the state of hospitals.†

Yet in the next reign (of Henry VI.) it was laid down by Littleton, who, with Bracton, is the great pillar of our common law, that where a religious house held land in free alms, they were bound before God to make prayers, orisons, masses, and other divine services for the souls of the donors, and therefore shall do no fealty to the lord; because the divine service is better for them before God than any doing of fealty (*i.e.* temporal service), "and because the very words 'free alms' exclude the lord from having any earthly or temporal service, but to have only divine and spiritual service to be done for him. And if they who hold in free alms will rest or fail to do such divine service, the lord may not distrain (the usual remedy for temporal service), but may complain to the ordinary or visitor" (*i.e.* the superior of the order), "praying him that he will lay some punishment for this; for the tenants in free alms are bound to do the divine service by the law of holy Church."‡

It is proper here to advert to the history of a species of trust perhaps as ancient as any—that of an executor or administrator—which will tend extremely to illustrate the subject. At common law a man might leave personal property by last will, though not real property; and if he made a will, he of course usually named the executors; and from the time of Bracton, we find it laid down that testamentary trusts were exclusively of episcopal cognisance. Wherever a person died, either without a will or without naming executors, the bishop, by the common law, was called upon to administer the personal estate§ (the land went to the heir), as he deemed most in accordance with the dictates of conscience as concerned the deceased man; that is, as nearly as possible, in the first place, to the purposes to which the man himself would, if living, have been bound by conscience; and next, to such uses as the bishop in his conscience considered most for the benefit of the soul of the deceased. Of course, the principles of Catholic theology would dictate, first, restitution or payment of debts;

\* 35 Edward I.

† 2 Henry V. c. 1.

‡ Littleton's Commentaries, sec. Frankalmoigne.

§ 11 Henry VII. c. 12.

next, provision for relatives; and, lastly, masses, alms, or other good works, spiritual or temporal, for the sake of the man's soul. Here was a purely spiritual trust, and clearly cognisable only in the spiritual courts; and accordingly it was always held at common law that no action could lie against the bishop, either upon the part of legatees, creditors, or relatives.\* When, however, the State was encroaching on the Church, an attempt was made to bring the bishop under the control of the secular court; and in the reign of Edward I. it was with that view enacted, that when a man died intestate and indebted, the bishop should be bound to answer the debts as far as the goods would extend, in such sort as executors would have been bound if the dead man had made a testament.† Now "in such sort" as the executors were bound of course meant to the extent of all the goods, excepting any claim of the Crown, which had priority over all other debts. And therefore the scope of the statute was this, that if the bishop were satisfied that all the dead man's goods had been acquired by robbery, and even by sacrilegious spoliation (and there were robbers of the Church in those days), so that restitution was due either to a priest, prior, prelate, or private party, yet inasmuch as this did not constitute a legal "debt," he would be compelled, if he regarded this law, to pay away all the property to the legal creditors, and so discharge the dead man's debts with money not his own. The probability is, of course, that in such cases the act was not regarded; and in all others it was quite needless, since the laws of the Church would bind the bishops to pay the debts first in cases where restitution was not a precedent duty.

If the deceased had made a will and appointed executors, they had to prove the will before the bishop or in his court; matters testamentary being always deemed of spiritual cognisance, on the principle, as stated by an old writer, Perkins, that "spiritual men were deemed of better conscience than laymen to know what was best for the soul of the deceased." And the bishop alone could compel the executors to prove the will, by means of excommunication and sequestration of the goods;‡ or if they refused to prove it, he could appoint administrators.§ In the execution of the will also they were responsible to the spiritual courts, before which they had to produce their accounts; as clearly appears from the statute of Edward III.,|| which declares that administrators should (after paying debts) "dispend the property for the soul of the

\* 18 Henry VI. c. 22.

† Statute of Westminster, 11, 13 Edward I.

‡ 9 Ed. IV. c. 33. § 3 Hen. IV. c. 22; 7 Ed. IV. c. 12; 3 Hen. VII. c. 14.

|| 31 Edward III. c. 11.



dead," and be accountable unto the ordinaries, "as executors be in the case of testament." The same fact appears also from a record in the parliamentary rolls of the reign of Henry V., in which the Commons petition that executors might not be hereafter compelled to travel to prove testaments, or carry inventories of the goods of the testator to the bishops or their officials: to which the answer of the Crown is, that the "king hath charged the lords spiritual to ordain due remedy."\*

The earliest instances of religious trusts reposed in private persons are trusts for the saying of masses, generally testamentary trusts. Thus, in the reign of Edward II., the executors of a testator, according to his will, conveyed lands to the Dean and Chapter of St. Paul's, to find ten marks yearly for a priest and his clerk to sing mass for the testator's soul and all Christian souls in the Church of St. Paul.† So in the reign of Edward III., a man devised lands to a friend and his heirs in trust to find yearly twelve marks to two chaplains to pray for souls,‡ which was, in fact, the erection of "a chantry," as these endowments were called. In the reign of Henry VI., Gervase Luissant conveyed land to certain persons to find a priest to say mass in a particular church every Sunday; and also a mass of *requiem* once a year. Now these trusts were purely spiritual, although reposed in secular persons, and secular emoluments were attached to them; and as the principal object of the trusts was spiritual, and the temporal emoluments only incidental, they were deemed to be of spiritual cognisance; and no trace can be found of any attempt on the part of the temporal courts—not even of Chancery, though it was then practically an ecclesiastical court of conscience—to interfere with them. And that the spiritual supervision was satisfactory, may be surmised from this simple fact, that these trusts continued to be performed down to the period of the Reformation, when they were all sacrilegiously suppressed.

The only way in which the courts of law and equity interfered in cases of religious trusts was not in enforcing their execution, but only in recovering the *property*. The trustee could sue in the courts of common law or chancery to obtain possession of the trust property; but the *trusts* were enforced in the ecclesiastical courts. And it was not until the reign of Edward IV. that Chancery gave a remedy against the representatives of the original trustee even to do thus much, to recover the property; and it was settled that if the trustee

\* Rotulæ Parliamenti, No. 23, 1 Henry V.

† Case of Dean of St. Paul's: Dyer's Reports. ‡ 40th Assize, 26.



transferred to a third party, and the latter took with notice of the trust, he would be liable to it.\* And so where money or property was delivered in trust to dispose of for the benefit of the donor's soul after his death, his executors could have a remedy by suit in Chancery to recover the property.† In short, it was repeatedly held that the Court of Chancery was a court of conscience;‡ and that as such alone, even to this extent, it could take cognisance of trusts, because they were matters of conscience, and so not cognisable by the law.§

Such was the law recognised in a case occurring not above a quarter of a century before the commencement of the Reformation.|| There a party had conveyed land to the parson of a church and his successors for the use of the parishioners to sustain the fabric of the church. This is perhaps the earliest instance of a "charitable trust," strictly so called, in the legal sense of the term; *i.e.* a charitable gift which it was intended should be enforced by the secular courts; for the use was specified, and it was one in which the parishioners would have a pecuniary interest, since (as the court said) they were bound by law to sustain the church, and the gift would be in aid of their pockets and spare their money. And though the trust, it was said, was a matter of "conscience," yet the Court of Chancery thus took cognisance of specific trusts, especially any in which parties had a peculiar pecuniary interest.

Thus, then, continued the law of religious trusts down to the period of the Reformation. They were considered as exclusively of spiritual cognisance in their own nature, and never could be enforced in a secular court, except in cases in which a party had by deed covenanted to perform specific spiritual duties; in which cases they were enforced, not as trusts, but as contracts. And one of the oracles of our ancient common law, who himself lived at the era of the Reformation, lays it down, that (apart from express covenant) those who are bound to do spiritual services should be sued in the spiritual courts if they neglected to perform them.¶ Over and over again it is recognised in the courts of law, that the remedy, even for waste of the temporalities of religious persons, is deprivation or deposition, to be inflicted only by the spiritual superiors; and that only in foundations entirely of a lay character could it be otherwise. Up to the Reformation, the administration of charitable property was purely spiritual. And that the system had worked well, and the administration of charitable or religious trusts had been on the whole faith-

\* 5 Edward IV. c. 7.

† 5 Ed. IV. c. 7.

‡ 9 Ed. IV. c. 15.

§ 7 Henry VII. c. 11.

|| 12 Henry VII. Trin. Term, c. 28.

¶ Fitzherbert's *Natura Brevium*.

ful, can easily be shewn. Parliament, as we have already noticed, repeatedly recognised the hospitalities and alms of religious houses—the species of trusts most purely spiritual, and altogether without any legal control, save in very special cases—and solemnly affirmed in the reign of Henry VIII., “that in the larger houses religion was right well observed;” while as to the secular clergy, from the highest to the lowest, the magnificent charities established in that age contrast painfully with their modern administration, or rather misappropriation; in the case of cathedral or collegiate schools, for example, as to which it is enough to refer to Mr. Whiston’s late pamphlet on cathedral trusts, and the case of the Dean and Chapter of Rochester in Chancery.

At the Reformation a new era commenced in the history of religious trusts; and we need scarcely say, it was an era of confiscation. The first trusts confiscated were those of religious houses, and then came those for saying masses, called “chantries,” or “chapels.” These were suppressed as superstitious by the statutes of Henry VIII. and Edward VI. Now, of course, according to the ancient law, the property ought to have reverted to the founders’ heirs, if they could be traced; and if not, should have been applied to purposes charitable and religious, for the welfare of the whole body of the community. Accordingly, both under Henry and Edward, a feeble show was affected of something of this kind, so as to give to confiscation as much as possible the aspect of commutation of sacred trusts. Out of the spoils of religious houses new cathedral foundations were to be raised, and out of the plunder of chantries schools were to be founded. The rapacity of the spoliators, however, for the most part appropriated the booty to private purposes. And thus “all those monuments of our forefathers’ piety and devotion to the honour of God, the propagation of Christian faith and good learning, and for the relief and maintenance of the poor and impotent, all these are every where pulled down, and their revenues sold and made away; and those goods and riches which the Christian piety of our English nation had consecrated to God since they first professed Christianity were dispersed and profaned.”\* And even as to the trusts permitted to remain, or now newly created, it may be easily conceived that such spoliators were scarcely likely to be faithful administrators. Indeed the spirit of spoliation which now prevailed with respect to religious trusts may be seen from the course of subsequent legislation. At the end of the reign of Elizabeth was passed the celebrated “statute of charitable uses,” to

\* Weever’s Discourse of Funeral Monuments, p. 115.



redress the grievous misappropriation of Protestant charitable trusts, which then had become flagrant. It may be mentioned in passing, that of this statute the scope was purely charity, as distinct from religion; "for religion," said its author, Sir Francis Moore, "is now variable with the pleasure of succeeding princes, and what at one time is accounted orthodox may at another be accounted superstitious; and thus lands given for the support of divine service may be confiscated, as appears by the statute of superstitious uses." A more severe sarcasm upon the spirit of the age of the Reformation could scarcely have been written; and it is written by a Protestant. But this by the way. To return to the statute of Elizabeth. One of the developments of the new doctrine of the royal supremacy, introduced at the Reformation, was the principle of lay and legal management of religious or charitable trusts. The lay chancellors began with More; and, curiously enough, with the infallible instinct even of a Catholic layman, the Court of Chancery began, under his auspices, to assume a new character; and the seeds were sown of the system of jurisdiction which Bacon more broadly brought out, and which, by subsequent Protestant chancellors, was elaborated into an enormous and formidable mode of procedure. The act of Elizabeth to which we have referred was passed fifty years after the Reformation, and it recites what strikingly shews the result of leaving charities to the protection of this court—which, in practice, was then already ceasing to be a court of conscience—viz. "that lands and other property given to the poor or for charity had not been employed according to the charitable intent of the givers, by reason of frauds, breaches of trust, and negligence." How was it that the Court of Chancery had not repressed these "frauds and breaches of trust," peculiarly the subjects of that court's jurisdiction, according to an adage of Coke's, who was living at this very time? Clearly because, under lay and legal chancellors, the procedure of the court was too cumbrous and costly to be set in motion effectively for the supervision of a charity. The act then proceeds to provide, by way of substitute for this procedure, that commissions under the great seal should issue "to the bishop of the diocese and his chancellor (who are thus put forward as the necessary and primary members of the commission) and other persons (who might be clerics), authorising them, or any four (of whom the bishop and his chancellor might be two, and of course the bishop would preside and have a casting vote), to inquire of breaches of trust, &c., and thereupon set down orders and decrees,"



&c. We clearly recognise here a trace of the old Catholic spirit which influenced the common law, reposing cognisance of trusts, as matters of confidence and conscience, in the spiritual judges, the prelates; leaving it to the temporal tribunals chiefly to aid in enforcing their jurisdiction. The act of Elizabeth constituted a mixed tribunal, partly spiritual and partly lay. And it will at once occur to inquire, why was such a tribunal constituted in preference to the Court of Chancery? Because trusts were essentially matters of conscience, and the Court of Chancery had ceased to be such a court. It had been so under the long and illustrious series of ecclesiastical chancellors; but lay chancellors arose after the Reformation; and though the first was a More, the second was an Audley; and lay lawyers being substituted for theologians—men bred in secular courts for men trained in sacred schools—conscience was soon choked in ties of hard technicality, which even eventually obstructed the operation of equity. The principle of a court of conscience was further recognised in the act of Elizabeth by the course of procedure prescribed; in this respect, that the commissioners were to call the parties interested before them for hearing and examination. But, above all, the great Catholic principle was recognised, that the will of the donor should be, as far as possible, faithfully followed; a fundamental principle, without which any system of administration of charitable trusts must, it was seen, amount to misappropriation. Nor was this all; for another Catholic principle was recognised, viz. that under any system compelling the disclosure of gifts for charitable purposes, they ought to be so far favoured by the law, that no faults or flaws of title should be admitted to affect them; provided only that there was a legal power to make the disposition, and an evident intention to make it. It is of great importance to observe that these Catholic principles were recognised by a Protestant parliament as to Protestant trusts. The principle which most directly, of course, concerned their administration was, that the bishop ought to have a prominent, if not a primary share in their management. The act provided further, “that the commissioners should, after inquiry, set down such orders and decrees as that the lands and funds might be duly and faithfully employed on such charitable uses and intents as they were given for by the donors; and which decrees (not being contrary to the directions of the donors) should stand good until altered by the lord chancellor.” The act, therefore, was virtually a recognition of the unfitness of the Court of Chancery for

the administration of charitable trusts, reserving, as it did, only a right of appeal to the chancellor; and practically even this right was only upon questions of title.

It is true that there was in this arrangement, as might have been expected, somewhat of a departure from the ancient Catholic principle of a purely spiritual system of administration for charitable trusts; but then it must be recollected, first, that this was a Protestant act for Protestant charities, and the essence of Protestantism was the recognition of the royal supremacy—the embodiment of the lay element as opposed to the spiritual; and secondly, that the charities coming within the powers of the act were really rather of a secular than spiritual character, carefully excluding any religion, and therefore very much of a merely temporal and material kind. This, of course, only enhances the value of the recognition the act affords of the principle of the superiority of spiritual over secular management of charitable trusts; a principle recognised by a Protestant legislature even as to trusts almost entirely secular. It could not be expected, however, that such a principle, so Catholic in its character, could continue to be recognised in a Protestant country. Moreover, it set up a rival jurisdiction to Chancery on the subject of charity, and was a constant reflection on the complicated and mischievous procedure of that court. Hence, as Protestantism developed itself on the one hand, and Catholicism died away on the other, and as the Court of Chancery increased the range of its jurisdiction, and the contrast of its procedure to the simple system of charitable commissions became more and more invidious, Protestant chancellors strove indirectly to do away with the act of Elizabeth; and at the era of the Revolution, when a spirit sordid, selfish, and sceptical, pervaded the land, they discontinued issuing these charitable commissions, and the act became obsolete, charities coming under the exclusive control of the Court of Chancery, and thenceforth forming a large portion of its prey.

The charitable act of Elizabeth, however, only referred, of course, to Protestant charities, and ignored all that were religious; although ultimately some relaxation of construction so far enlarged its scope in that respect, as to embrace endowments partly of a religious character, as for the support of a preacher, or the augmentation of a vicarage or stipend. Its author, in his exposition of the statute, lays it down that schools for learning were within it, but not schools for catechising; as “religion is variable and not within the statute.”

And even within this limited scope, he intended, and the courts took care, that Catholics should have no advantage from



the act; their religion and priesthood being proscribed by the penal laws. He says, "scholars" must be restrained to the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge, and to students that there study divinity, &c.; and not to any students of divinity in Popery.\* Accordingly, within a few years after the act was passed, it was held in a case in which a "Popish recusant" had conveyed certain lands to persons, "upon hope" that they would employ the property of the land to the use of poor scholars in Oxford or Cambridge, or elsewhere, being such as studied divinity and took holy orders according to the discretion of the feoffees" (doubtless Catholics), "and agreeable to the intent of the feoffee," because the party was a recusant, and his intent by the words might appear to be that the employment should be upon poor Popish priests; for the word "elsewhere," in its meaning, is some foreign university; and the "holy orders" they intend are Popish; therefore it was decreed that the heirs should have the land, because the use was not charitable, but superstitious. And again, in another case where land was conveyed by one "recusant" to another upon trust, that the profits might be employed on an hospital of religious, which should be renewed when the times would serve; and in the meantime the profits to be employed to the relief of poor people, at the discretion of the trustee, according to the intent of the donor (who doubtless had expressed it secretly, or it was well understood), "because it was apparent that the donor was a recusant, and the employment must be according to his intent," and his intent could be no other than the relief of poor recusants, which is not agreeable to law, therefore the land was decreed to the heir† upon these principles. Although, therefore, it was held that a Popish recusant might be trustee to a charitable use, it must of necessity have been very difficult for him to administer or use for "Popish" purposes, under the authority of the act of Elizabeth.

It is to be observed, however, that the only reason for the Catholic trusts not coming within the scope of the act was clearly the penal laws rendering them illegal; and that but for those laws they would have been administered in the same manner as the Protestant trusts. And further, it is clear that if the Catholic Church had then been permitted to remain upon the same footing as the Protestant, the charitable commissions issued for Catholic trusts must have been to the Catholic Bishop or Vicar-apostolic of the diocese or district, and his Vicar-general and other "proper persons," being Catholics. The principle was carried into practice only with reference

\* Sir F. Moore's exposition of the act, in *Duke on Charitable Uses*, c. 7.

† Lady Egerton's case : *Duke*.



to Protestant charities; but as it was recognised, it is equally applicable to Catholic charities, and was precluded from applying to them by reason of the penal laws alone.

The penal laws deprived Catholic charities of the protection of the law; but that they existed is plain, from the cases already alluded to, and many others. They existed, however, not only as secret trusts, but as purely spiritual trusts; and it is important to remark the distinction. It was not of the slightest use to make Catholic charities trusts, in the legal sense of the term; first, because the law did not enforce such trusts; and secondly, because it would confiscate them if disclosed, and trustees *might* in some way be obliged to disclose them. These were not, therefore, trusts kept secret; there were no trusts at all, legally speaking; there was solely a confidence reposed in a particular person; probably not always expressed, or if expressed, only in the way of hope or wish, and by word of mouth, not in writing. The doctrine of trusts was not then very distinctly laid down in the strict and stringent way in which it has been since; and this was not sufficient to constitute a trust in the legal sense. There was only, therefore, a purely spiritual trust; *i. e.* one only imposed upon the conscience, and cognisable only by a purely spiritual authority, in the confessional of the priest, or by appeal to the bishop. The law still allowed Catholics to hold land, and, of course, all other property; and it is clear that the custom existed and was carried downwards from the period of the Reformation of giving lands and funds to Catholics who could be depended on; which, of course, in conscience, they would construe as an implied confidence that they would apply it for the maintenance of religion. And in their performance of this sacred duty the conscientious Catholic would of course apply for direction to a prudent and experienced priest; and both would as far as possible conform to the authority of the bishop. Practically then, after all, the administration of Catholic charitable and religious trusts under the old penal laws would have been where it originally and always had been, under a purely spiritual authority, and in the hands primarily of the bishops. So continued matters from the Reformation until the Revolution: at this latter period it was found that by this secret system the Catholic faith had been so far maintained and propagated, that a new course of penal legislation was commenced by the defenders of "civil and religious liberty," preventing "Papists" from holding land at all. This, however, only introduced a new system of secret evasions; and the practice prevailed of Catholics giving or leaving land to Protestant trustees, in trust to pay the rents to a (secret) Catholic;

who again received it under the same obligation of conscience to apply it to the purposes of the Catholic religion. Practically, therefore, the system of spiritual trusts still continued, though, of course, under greater difficulties than before; and thus was the old faith kept up in this unhappy country through that dark and dreary period in our history which marks the duration of the cruel penal laws; a period extending down to almost living memory, to the latter half of the reign of George III.

During this period the Catholic religious trusts were, as we have said, exactly in the position in which they were before the Reformation; with this sole difference, that the temporal courts would not, of course, take cognisance of them so as to enable the trustees to recover the property; and we have already shewn that it was only for this purpose those tribunals had ever taken cognisance of such trusts, and never for the purpose of enforcing their execution. The Catholic Bishops or Vicars-apostolic were as much after as before the Reformation the exclusive authorities for this purpose, and, of course, over the consciences of Catholics their adjudications had as much claim to obedience as ever they had, the sole difference being that the temporal law no longer recognised them or assisted in their enforcement.

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#### AMERICAN SLAVERY AND AMERICAN PROTESTANTISM.

THE excitement that was produced by *Uncle Tom's Cabin* is far from being yet spent. New editions of the work, or new works intended to confirm and illustrate it, are still issuing from the press. It circulates, and circulates largely, in all classes of society, from the palace to the cottage. Noble ladies meet together in Sutherland House to memorialise their sisters on the other side of the Atlantic *à propos* to this wonderful book; ladies of gentle manners, but of a less aristocratic bearing, clad for the most part in drab or russet silks, go through our streets knocking at every door and soliciting the subscription of our names at least, if not of our moneys, towards some address or more substantial gift destined for the popular authoress; even in a poor school in one of our large commercial cities, where we chanced to be present a few weeks ago at the annual examination of the children, a perfect forest of hands was raised from all parts of the school in



reply to the query, "Who among you have read *Uncle Tom's Cabin*?" And within the last few weeks we observe that our northern neighbours—whether of the Society of Friends or of the Presbyterian communion we do not now remember—have invited the writer to brave the perils of the ocean and come to Glasgow, to be "made a lion of." Now, we need hardly say, that we are far from grudging Mrs. Stowe this meed of universal popularity; both her talents and her benevolence have naturally earned it, and we rejoice to see her receiving her reward. But amid this universal hubbub of excitement, there is one sentence—one little sentence—in her work, which is ever recurring to our minds, as pregnant with subject-matter for the deepest reflection, yet strangely overlooked, as far as we have had any opportunity of observing, by all classes of readers and critics. The words to which we allude are these: "The Christian Church has a heavy account to answer; North and South are guilty before God." Mrs. Stowe is herself, we understand, the wife of a Protestant minister, and it is of the Protestant Church that she is speaking; and it is to be presumed that she knows what she is saying, and does not bring accusations against her own brethren which she is not prepared to substantiate. Unfortunately, however, the plot of her late work does not give her an opportunity (or if it does, she has not chosen to avail herself of it) to enter upon the proof of the charge which she has ventured to make against her co-religionists with reference to their mode of dealing with the slavery question: it is the object of the following pages to supply in some measure this important omission, to mention *some* items at least of that heavy account which, according to the judgment of Mrs. Stowe, the Protestant Church of America has to answer before God for her treatment of the coloured population. In other words, the precise point to which we desire to call our readers' attention is this, that, as Christianity—that is to say, Catholicism, since this was the only form of Christianity then in existence—was the powerful agent by whose means the horrors of ancient and pagan slavery were gradually mitigated, and at length slavery itself altogether abolished; so Protestantism, in all the various phases in which it exists in America, is the great obstacle at the present day which stands in the way of the improvement and final abolition of modern slavery.

We cannot go at length through all the proof of the former portion of this proposition. Its truth is now very generally acknowledged; and the immortal work of Balmez is at hand for the use of those who are disposed to call it in question. Our space will only allow us to mention some few



points in the relations between the ancient Church and slavery, to which the present relations of slavery and Protestantism in America happen to afford the most striking contrast.

The effects which were produced by Christianity in ameliorating the condition of slaves may be estimated in two ways: by observing, first, the legislation of the Church, properly so called, in the decrees of her synods and councils; and secondly, the improvements that were introduced into civil legislation through her influence. As an instance of this latter kind, we may mention the law of Constantine, placing the wilful murder of a slave on the same footing with the wilful murder of a freeman, and expressly including the case of a slave who died under punishment, unless that punishment were inflicted with the usual instruments of correction; in which case the result might be supposed to be, in some measure at least, accidental, and contrary to the master's intention. Again, although there are some traces, even under pagan emperors, of a feeling against the separation of the different members of slaves' families, yet no positive legislative enactments on the subject were issued prior to several humane rules established by the same Christian emperor. This is a branch of the subject, however, which it is enough to have thus briefly hinted at; even of the laws and canons of the Church we can only find room for a very few, by way of specimen, sufficient to shew the ideas and principles upon which her legislation was conducted. It was decreed by the Council of Elvira, held in the beginning of the fourth century, that a mistress who should have beaten her slave so as to cause her death should be subject to a penance to endure five or seven years. Another early canon excommunicates a master who should put his slave to death on his own authority. Other canons allow slaves to take refuge in churches, and oblige the master not to punish them on receiving them again, nor to make them wear any distinctive badge, excepting only in cases of very heinous crime. The Council of Orleans, held in 549, decreed, that if a master, in violation of this promise, dared to maltreat his slave, he should be excommunicated. Slaves became admissible into the priesthood and into religious communities; and an instance is not wanting of a person who had been a slave becoming a bishop. Under the teaching of the Church, it came to be considered meritorious to emancipate slaves either during life or by a testamentary disposition; and to give emancipation the greater solemnity, it usually took place in churches; and canons were made especially to guarantee the perpetual freedom of those who had been so emancipated. Even slaves who had

been only recommended to the Church by will were protected by ecclesiastical censures from all kinds of servitude. "Very early instances occur," we are told, "of lords enfranchising their villains at the intercession of their spiritual confessors."\* In our own country we find the Church making two very remarkable canons for the benefit of slaves; one in 692, that if a slave shall work on the Lord's day by his master's command, he shall become free; and the other in 697, if a master gives his slave flesh-meat on a Friday, let him depart free. This last canon may provoke a smile perhaps in some of our Protestant readers, but it was, in truth, a most important decree; the principle which was involved in it being the protection of the slave in the free exercise of his religion. It has been suggested also, and not without plausibility, that the rule of the Church which commands us to abstain from servile work on certain days was especially directed to the relief of this oppressed class; for, under the old Roman law, the slave had no holiday, with perhaps a single exception; his life was a life of uninterrupted toil. The Church, therefore, enjoining the observance of holidays, and watching over slaves with the same interest as over her other children, or rather regarding them with special tenderness, as more urgently needing her motherly care and protection, employs a term in this command which seems to have a special reference to the servile class. Another of the most oppressive burdens and cruel outrages under which this class hopelessly groaned in pagan times, was an utter disregard of their social relations—the invalidity or voidability of slaves' marriages. Upon this fundamental point the language of the Church was most distinct and peremptory: "Neither bond nor free," said the decretal of St. Gregory, "may be separated from the sacraments of the Church; the marriages among slaves must not be hindered; and though contracted against their masters' will, ought not on that account to be dissolved."

These are only a few specimens of ecclesiastical legislation, selected out of many. After all, however, no enumeration of specific canons and decrees, however detailed, can give any but a very faint notion of the real influence exercised by Catholic Christianity in destroying slavery. Eminently beneficial as was the action of the Church both on the decrees of civil rulers and in her own legislation, it was in her daily private teaching that the history of this, as well as of most other chapters in the civilisation of Europe, is to be read. It was in enforcing on the master his duty towards the slave, and on the slave his duty towards his master, that she bound each to

\* Eden's *State of the Poor*, vol. i. p. 10.



each by the bonds of mutual charity, and changed the current ideas of mankind upon this whole subject. It has been well said by Balmez, that "it is impossible for society to remain for any length of time under an order of things which is formally opposed to the ideas with which it is imbued." When, therefore, the leaven of the Christian doctrines—that all men have a common origin and the same destiny, that all are equal before God and brethren in Jesus Christ—when the leaven of these doctrines had thoroughly pervaded society, slavery was first softened and then gradually abolished, until at length, in the thirteenth century, it ceased to exist in Catholic Europe. It was a gradual, prudent, but most efficacious process, whereby the Christian Church in ancient times succeeded in breaking the odious chain of slavery, "without a single violent stroke." Her proceedings may be thus briefly recapitulated in the words of the same great author whom we have just quoted:

"First, she loudly teaches the real doctrines concerning the dignity of man; she defines the obligations of masters and slaves; she declares them equal before God, and thus completely destroys the degrading theories which stain the writings even of the greatest philosophers of antiquity. She then comes to the application of her doctrines; she labours to improve the treatment of slaves; she struggles against the atrocious right of life and death; she opens her temples to them as asylums, and when they depart thence, prevents their being ill-treated; she labours to substitute public tribunals for private vengeance. . . . The Church gives an example of mildness and disinterestedness; she facilitates emancipation by admitting slaves into monasteries and the ecclesiastical state; she facilitates it by all the other means that charity suggests; and thus it is that, in spite of the deep roots of slavery in ancient society, in spite of the *bouleversement* caused by the irruptions of the barbarians; in spite of so many wars and calamities of every kind, which in great measure paralysed the effect of all regulating and beneficent action; yet we see slavery—that dishonour and leprosy of ancient civilisation—rapidly diminish among Christians, until it finally disappears" (c. xix.).

Now, let us contrast with this the action of modern Protestantism upon the same social evil. Slavery exists at the present day in the Southern States of North America; and it seems perfectly certain that it is accompanied by acts of cruelty and oppression scarcely, if at all, inferior to any that we read of in the pages of pagan history. The religion of those states, to speak generally, is Protestant. How, then, does Protestantism behave itself towards this social leprosy? what steps does it take towards its mitigation and removal? First, let us look at the *words* of Protestant authorities, at

the language which they use when speaking or writing on the subject, the theory which they propound in their articles of faith, and which they profess to follow; and next, let us examine their acts, the course of conduct which they actually pursue.

First, as to words. We are told by competent Protestant authority, that the most powerful ecclesiastical body in the slave states of America is the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church. We need hardly remind our readers that slavery was introduced into America whilst that country was yet under English rule. After the revolution, when the constitution of the new people was being agitated, the subject of slavery naturally entered, as a not unimportant question, into the debates. It was generally believed, at least in half the states, that the evil would not be of long duration. Accordingly, when the discussion reached the Church, the Presbyterian synods of New York and Philadelphia published a declaration, "highly approving of the principles in favour of universal liberty which prevail in America;" exhorted the slave-holders in their own communion to prepare their slaves for the enjoyment of freedom by means of a good education; and finally, recommended them to use the most prudent measures, consistent with the interest and state of civil society, in the countries where they live, to procure eventually the final abolition of slavery in America. This language was both humane and temperate; and it was published, in 1793, as the decision of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church. In the following year they spoke still more strongly. In a note to the 142d question of their Larger Catechism, on the eighth commandment, they refer to the text (1 Tim. i. 10) which speaks of "men-stealers," and they say that "this word, in its original import, comprehends all who are concerned in bringing any of the human race into slavery, or in *retaining them in it*; and that the Apostle here classes them with sinners of the first rank. To steal a free man is the highest kind of theft. In other instances we only steal human property; but when we steal *or retain* men in slavery we seize those who, in common with ourselves, are constituted by the original grant lords of the earth." "To *hold* any man in slavery is to be every day guilty of robbing him of his liberty, or of man-stealing," said one of the congregational doctors of divinity in 1791; and another, fifteen years earlier, "slave-holding is, *in every instance*, wrong, unrighteous, and oppressive—a very great and crying sin, there being nothing equal to it on the face of the earth." Thus, we see that the Presbyterians, both individually and collectively by the voice



of their General Assembly, in their anxiety to protest against slavery, confound two things which are essentially distinct—slave-holding and slave-stealing; and the General Assembly, moreover, makes a false statement on a matter of scholarship, to justify the confusion. How Dr. Samuel Hopkins (the author last quoted) reconciled his proposition concerning slave-holding with the undoubted recognition of that practice in the law of Moses, it is not for us to determine. However, his error upon this subject, and that of his co-religionists, was, at least, on the side of humanity, and therefore should be dealt gently with, more especially if we find that they have uniformly been jealous to bring their practice into strict conformity with so humane a doctrine. On this we shall have to speak more at length presently; meanwhile, it may be well to repeat in this place an important observation of the author from whose pages we have taken the foregoing facts,\* viz. that all these discussions and resolutions about slavery, on the part of the Presbyterian community, took place in connexion with similar discussions and resolutions that were going on in the world around them, *being, in fact, little more than an echo of the popular voice.* So much, then, for the Presbyterians. Let us next turn to the Methodists. The language of John Wesley, the father and founder of Methodism, fell not an iota short of that of the Presbyterian teachers of Christianity. He even made the very same confusion between slave-holders and slave-makers. “What I have said to slave-traders,” he writes, “equally concerns all slave-holders, of whatever rank and degree; *seeing that men-buyers are exactly on a level with men-stealers.*” In 1780, the whole community declared slavery to be both hurtful to society and “contrary to the laws of God;” in 1784 it refused to admit slave-holders to its communion, passing a vote to exclude all such.† In the Methodist Book of Doctrines and Discipline, it is laid down as the “only one condition previously required of those who desire admission into their society, a desire to flee from the wrath to come and to be saved from their sins; that this desire must be evidenced by certain fruits—by avoiding evil of every kind, especially that which is most generally practised, such as the buying and selling of men, women, and children with an intention to enslave them.”

These, we are assured, are only fair specimens of the language of American Protestantism on the subject of slavery

\* “The Church as it is; or, the Forlorn Hope of Slavery.” By Parker Pillsbury. Boston, 1847.

† “Letter to the People of the United States, touching the matter of Slavery.” By Theodore Parker. Boston, 1848.

towards the close of the last century. None of its numerous sects, excepting perhaps the Episcopalian, were indifferent; all vied with one another in using the very strongest terms of reprobation against an evil which they believed to be on the wane, and would finally disappear in less than fifty years. But fifty years have come and gone, and the "peculiar domestic institution," as the Americans, by a conventional euphemism, are fond of calling it, still remains; and what has Protestantism during this period done for its removal, and what is its present position towards it? We might answer these questions in a single word, by saying that it has done *nothing*. "The whole of the Presbyterian Church," says one of its most distinguished members, "have been sound asleep upon 'the highest kind of theft;' and while the 'sinners of the first rank' have multiplied and extended their man-stealing on every side, Presbyteries, Synods, and General Assemblies have been silent as death and still as midnight." The same might be said of the Methodists also, and of the rest. But this answer, though true enough as far as it goes, falls very far short of the real state of the case. *American Protestantism has done every thing that it was possible to do to, bind the yoke of slavery still more firmly upon the necks of the poor oppressed negroes, and to perpetuate their present state of degradation.* This is a very grave charge; but when our readers have learnt the facts which we are about to lay before them, we are satisfied they will not consider that it has been overstated.

We have seen that one of the first and most important steps which was taken by the Church of old towards the abolition of slavery was the declaration that masters and slaves were equal before God, "thus completely destroying the degrading theories which stain the writings even of the greatest philosophers of antiquity." It was reserved for modern Protestantism to reproduce those "degrading theories," if not in actual words, yet certainly in the not less emphatic form of deeds. We do not say that Protestant ministers in America never proclaim from the pulpit the solemn truths so clearly enunciated by St. Paul: "Know that whatsoever good things any man shall do, the same shall he receive from the Lord, *whether he be bond or free;*" and again, "there is *no respect of persons* with God:" we do not say that such passages of Holy Writ are never commented upon and explained in their full and proper sense in an American Protestant pulpit, though at the same time we are bound to add, that we believe they are very rarely, if ever, so used; for we find in one of the books before us the testimony of a Dr. Nelson, described as "for many years a slaveholder, but afterwards



President of the Literary and Theological Institution in Illinois (apparently of the Presbyterian persuasion), in which the following words occur:—"I have been intimately acquainted with the religious opportunities of slaves, in the constant habit of hearing the sermons which are preached to them; and I solemnly affirm, that during the forty years of my residence and observation in this line, *I never* heard a single one of these sermons but what was taken up with the obligations and duties of slaves to their masters. Indeed, *I never heard a sermon to slaves but what made obedience to masters by the slaves the fundamental and supreme law of religion.*" However, let us suppose for a moment that it were otherwise; let us imagine that Protestant ministers in America are as indefatigable in preaching the perfect equality of all men in the sight of God, as they certainly are in inculcating the duty of obedience from slaves to their masters; let us give them the full benefit of this highly improbable supposition, the damning fact still remains, that they do not *practise* the equality which they preach. Example is ever more efficacious than precept; and the example of American Protestantism directly countenances the "degrading theory" that the white man and the black are *not* equal in the sight of God. "In the United States," says the intelligent and trustworthy French traveller, M. Beaumont,\* "the churches of the Catholics are the only ones which do not admit of any privileges or exclusions; the black population can enter them just as freely as the white. *In the churches of Protestants the blacks are either banished into some obscure corner, or altogether excluded.*" And, in another place, the same gentleman observes, "Protestant congregations in this country are select societies as it were, their members belonging for the most part to the same rank and social position; the Catholic churches, on the other hand, receive persons of all classes and conditions of life without any distinction whatever. Here the poor man is placed on an equality with the rich, the slave with the master, the black man with the white." And, lest the testimony of a Catholic should be suspected of error or partiality in this matter, let us add the testimony of an English Protestant gentleman, Colonel Hamilton, which is unimpeachable.

"Both Catholics and Protestants," he says,† "agree in the tenet that all men are equal in the sight of God; but the former alone gives practical exemplification of his creed. In a Catholic church the prince and the peasant, *the slave and his master*, kneel before the same altar, in temporary oblivion of all worldly distinctions. . . .

\* Marie, ou l'Esclavage aux Etats-Unis. Paris, 1842.

† Men and Manners in America, vol. ii. p. 209. Blackwood, 1832.

The stamp of degradation is obliterated from the forehead of the slave, when he beholds himself admitted to community of worship with the highest and noblest in the land. But in Protestant churches a different rule prevails. People of colour are either excluded altogether, or are mewed up in some remote corner, separated by barriers from the body of the church. It is impossible to forget their degraded condition even for a moment. It is brought home to their feelings in a thousand ways. No white Protestant would kneel at the same altar with a black one. He asserts his superiority every where; and the very hue of his religion is affected by the colour of his skin. . . . Can it be wondered, therefore, that the slaves in Louisiana are all Catholics; that while the congregation of the Protestant Church consists of a few ladies, arranged in well-cushioned pews, the whole floor of the extensive cathedral should be crowded with worshippers of all colours and classes? The Catholic priests never forget that the most degraded of human forms is animated by a soul as precious in the eye of religion as that of the Sovereign Pontiff. The arms of the church are never closed against the meanest outcast of society. Divesting themselves of all pride of caste, they mingle with the slaves, and certainly understand their character far better than any other body of religious teachers. I am not a Catholic, but I cannot suffer prejudice of any sort to prevent my doing justice to a body of Christian ministers, whose humble lives are passed in communicating to the meanest and most despised of mankind the blessed comforts of religion."

And, if still further testimony were wanting, we might quote the acknowledgments of the Presbyterian Synod of South Carolina and Georgia, in 1833, (quoted by W. Jay in his *Slavery in America*, p. 129. London, 1835,) who report that the negroes in those states have no regular and efficient ministry and no churches; "neither is there sufficient room in *white churches* for their accommodation. We know of but *five churches* in the slave-holding states built expressly for their use." White churches and black! We shall expect to hear next that these American students of the Protestant Bible have discovered that there are white mansions and black in the kingdom of heaven. Indeed, they have already learnt how to carry this Christian and charitable distinction between the white man and the black beyond the narrow limits of the span of human life.

"The aristocracy of colour," says Judge Jay, himself a member of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States, "is maintained, not only in God's temples, but even in that last abode, where all distinctions have been supposed to disappear. In the very grave-yard, where death reigns as conqueror, and worms revel on the mouldering remains of manliness and beauty, . . . prejudice has his dwelling; and caste, *under the sanction of the*



*Church*, rears his hideous and revolting form. How many similar instances there may be, I know not; the following has come under immediate notice. The vestry and wardens of an Episcopal Church in the diocese of New York, a few years since, accepted a deed for a cemetery which was demised to them upon the express condition, embodied in the indenture, that they should never suffer any coloured person to be buried in any part of the same; and all the subsequent conveyances, on the part of the Church, of vaults and burying-places are subject to the same condition."

Such is the eloquent commentary supplied by Protestant practice on the other side of the Atlantic upon those texts of Holy Writ which speak of the abolition, under the Christian dispensation, of the distinction between bond and free men, and of the equality of all mankind in the presence of their Creator. Coleridge has somewhere pointed out that the feeling of caste is the origin of the very word *unkindness*; and certainly, whatever we may think of the correctness of this dictum as a matter of etymology, no one can for a moment doubt that every thing which tends to foster and encourage this odious spirit of caste, necessarily widens the breach between the two classes of masters and slaves, and has a direct and powerful tendency to promote the *permanent* degradation of the latter.

In vain do Protestant theologians, or Protestant synods, like the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church, "make known their sentiments" (as they somewhat quaintly express it) upon the subject of slavery, and declare, that it is "a gross violation of the most precious and sacred rights of human nature; that it is utterly inconsistent with the law of God, which requires us to love our neighbour as ourselves, and totally irreconcilable with the spirit and principles of the gospel of Christ, which enjoins 'that all things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them;'" —utterly meaningless, we say, or, far worse, grossly hypocritical, is such language as this in the mouths of men who practically tolerate, or rather themselves impose, those marks of inferiority and degradation, even in sacred places, which we have just pointed out. As long as the so-called Christian Church teaches that the souls of black men, if converted at all, are to be converted in separate pews from the souls of white men, so long is that Church vigorously upholding the very fundamental principle upon which modern slavery is built. To declaim and agitate for emancipation whilst retaining this most unchristian distinction, is to act like a man who should profess an anxiety to rid his field of some noxious weed, and then proceed, for this purpose, to lop off the heads of some half

dozen specimens with one hand, whilst with the other he was scattering seed broad-cast to ensure a new and abundant crop. Protestants themselves seem to have been conscious of this inconsistency; but instead of raising their practice to the strict standard of their theory, they have chosen rather to bring down their theory to the level of their practice. In 1816, the Presbyterians *erased* from the statutes of their church the note on man-stealing and slave-holding, which they had adopted in 1794, and which has been already commented upon; and in 1843, they resolved that "the Assembly do not think it for the edification of the Church for this body to take any action on the subject of slavery." In like manner the Methodists, who in 1801 decreed the excommunication of every buyer, seller, or holder of slaves, resolved in 1836, that they "wholly disclaim any wish, right, or intention, to interfere in the civil and political relation between master and slave, as it exists in the slave-holding States of this Union;" and later still, the general Conference has declared that American slavery "is not a moral evil."

But we have no space here to write this new chapter in the history of the variations of Protestantism; we must return again to a consideration of its *deeds*. It has been already mentioned as an important feature in the action of the early Church towards the abolition of slavery, that she "facilitated emancipation, by admitting slaves into monasteries and the ecclesiastical state." In Protestant America, on the contrary, we find "the religious organs" of the South insisting upon the necessity of "committing the instruction of the blacks *wholly* to white men;" and they go on to advise that "they should be Southern men, in whom masters have confidence. If the preacher is himself a slaveholder, he will command the greater confidence, and have access to the larger number of plantations." Moreover, it appears that the Episcopalians, always the most aristocratic of Protestant sects, object to having "coloured clergymen" at all in the ranks of their ministry. There have been instances of such a phenomenon; but the unhappy individuals thus promoted, so far from being thereby raised to a position of equality and independence, have only found themselves exposed to insults and injuries, of which the superior education they had necessarily received had made them more keenly sensitive.

"The Rev. Peter Williams, for many years a respectable clergyman of New York" (Judge Jay, himself an Episcopalian, is still our authority), "was never allowed to sit as a member of the Diocesan Convention. In the diocese of Pennsylvania, an express canon debars the African Church from being represented in the Convention, and



excludes the rector from a seat. The Rev. Mr. De Grasse, a coloured clergyman of the Episcopal Church, of fine talents, excellent acquirements, and amiable disposition, sought in the West Indies the respectful treatment and sympathy he could not find at home. He once said to the writer, with tears in his eyes, 'I feel that the bishop and many of the clergy are against us; that they do not want any coloured clergymen in the Church. I have struggled against the conviction, but it is impossible to resist it; the proofs are too strong; I experience it daily; I know it is so.'

The same author tells us that, in 1839, a negro candidate for holy orders presented himself for admission into the General Theological Seminary at New York. His diocesan, Dr. Onderdonk, assured the trustees that "*if they should think it right and proper to admit a coloured man into the Seminary, he considered the applicant before them one in whose case it might with great safety and propriety be done.*" However, spite of this cautiously-worded testimonial from the father (?) of the flock, the application was refused, the true and only cause being (it is stated) the colour of the candidate's skin. Other Protestant sects appear to have been not so exclusive; yet these too have entirely failed to present that union of charity and prudence which was so marked a characteristic of the early Church in her treatment of this delicate matter. She did not refuse, on the one hand, to the despised race of slaves an entrance into the sacred ranks of the ministry; whilst, on the other hand, her high sense of the dignity of that holy office caused her to require as an essential condition of ordination, that the candidate should first have been set at liberty; and history shews us, that the number of slaves who were thus freed was very considerable. The Baptist Association of Alabama adopts one portion of this ancient discipline and not the other, and seems to be happily unconscious of any incongruity in the following obituary notice which is taken from the *Georgia Christian Index* of a few years since.

"Departed this life, on the 24th of Nov. last, the Rev. Baptist Minister Cæsar, in the 76th year of his age. Cæsar was a native of Virginia, a servant, and emigrated to Alabama with his master, Mr. J. Blackwell, in the early settling of the country. Cæsar being a good servant, and a zealous and good preacher of the Gospel of Christ, *his master gave him considerable liberty and time to go and discharge his duty as a minister*, until his master died. Then, on the 15th day of December, 1828, *the Alabama Baptist Association purchased Cæsar, and gave him liberty to visit all the churches in its bounds, and preach the everlasting Gospel for the benefit of the coloured population of the country.*"

Now, as it is part of the American law concerning slaves,

that they can "possess nothing, nor acquire any thing, but what must belong to their master," we feel some curiosity to know how the substantial proceeds of the Rev. Cæsar's ministerial labours were ultimately disposed of; whether he had a certain per-centage allowed him for pocket-money, or whether the uttermost farthing was rigorously exacted for the coffers of the Alabama Association. Without further information upon this head than we at present possess, and looking only at the strict letter of the law, the relation between this reverend slave and his associated masters reminds us very unpleasantly of "a certain damsel at Philippi possessed with a spirit of divination, *which brought her masters much gain by soothsaying.*"

We will not insist upon many other minor contrasts which occur to us between the action of Catholicity and of Protestantism upon the evils of slavery; but proceed at once to mention that one before which all the others sink into a mere nothing; we allude to the subject of servile marriages. When first we saw stated in a contemporary review one of the facts which we are about to lay before our readers, we refused to believe it; it appeared to us absolutely incredible that such conduct could really have received the sanction of any community calling itself Christian. We took great pains to ascertain the state of the case more accurately, and the result is what we will now proceed to explain. The statement to which we refer was this: "The Methodist Church, not long ago, decided that slave marriage is no marriage, and the slave sold from his wife is religiously justified in forming a second union at the bidding of his new master." We need not remind the readers of *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, that one of the worst and most revolting features in American slavery is the ruthless way in which all social relations amongst them are ignored and severed. The marriage relation is not recognised. A slave may indeed be formally married; but so far as legal rights and obligations are concerned, it is an idle ceremony. The law knows no more of the marriage of slaves than it does of the marriage of brutes. A slave's wife may at any moment be legally taken from him and sold in the market. The slave-laws thus boldly set at nought the injunction of the Supreme Lawgiver—"What God hath joined together, let no man put asunder." Now of course it is horrible enough that all this should be authorised by the civil law of the land; but that the legislative council of any religious community calling itself Christian should deliberately lend its countenance to such enormities, and endorse their natural and necessary consequences with the sanction of the Christian name,—this is a degree of



guilt which we could scarcely bring ourselves to believe even of the most degraded of Protestant sects. We find, however, that our charitable judgment was mistaken. We are not indeed in a position to publish the exact formula of this infamous decree, as given by the Methodist Conference; but this is of less importance, since we have the *ipsissima verba* of two other Protestant communities of at least equal respectability; and we are assured on trustworthy authority, that the decision of the Methodists was in substance at least, if not in form, identical. The *fact* that the Methodists have given such a decision is mentioned, amongst other places, in the *White Slave*; but among the thousands and tens of thousands of English readers that that volume has had, we doubt whether as many individuals could be found who have paused to give the subject that important consideration which it deserves, nay rather which it *demand*s from all moral, religiously-disposed Protestants.

“ Though the Methodists hold that a marriage between two slaves, celebrated by one of their ministers, is, in the eye of God, every way complete and binding on the parties—who, according to Methodist ideas, have souls to be saved as well as white people—yet, notwithstanding the famous text, ‘ Whom God hath joined together, let not man put asunder,’ they have been obliged, in the Slave States of America, to concede the supremacy of man; and to admit that parties, separated by the command of a master or the operation of the slave-trade, may *rightly enough* marry again, even though they know their former partners to be living. They excuse this by saying that they do it *of necessity*; since the people, having little taste for celibacy, will form new connections; and *they may as well sanction what they cannot help*; the same excuse which they give for allowing their church members to hold slaves—the pious brethren will do it, whether or no; a policy, in both cases, seeming to look rather to the numbers than to the purity of the Church; and perhaps partaking something more of the wisdom of the serpent than of the harmlessness of the dove.”—*The White Slave*, c. lvi.

This is only the assertion of a writer of fiction; but it is corroborated, in the case of other Protestant bodies, by authentic documents which we will now quote. The following question was proposed to a Baptist Association which met at Gourdvine, Va., in the month of September 1846, by one of the churches or congregations in connection with that body: “ Is a servant, whose husband or wife has been sold by his or her master into a distant country, to be permitted to marry again?” The query was referred to a committee, and this committee made a report which, after discussion, was adopted. It ran thus: “ That in view of the circumstances in which

servants in this country are placed, the committee are *unanimous* in the opinion, that it is better to permit servants thus circumstanced to take another husband or wife!" The Baptist Church (so to call it) in the United States contained at this time about 100,000 slaves, whose matrimonial rights were thus cruelly violated, or rather declared to be null. The Savannah River Presbyterian Association, in reply to the same question, "Whether in a case of involuntary separation, of such a character as to preclude all prospect of future intercourse, the parties ought to be allowed to marry again?" gave answer, "That such a separation, among persons situated as our slaves are, is civilly a separation by death; *and they believe that, in the sight of God, it would be so viewed.* To forbid second marriages in such cases, would be to expose the parties, not only to stronger hardships and strong temptations, but to church-censure for acting in obedience to their masters, who cannot be expected to acquiesce in a regulation at variance with justice to the slaves, *and to the spirit of that command which regulates marriage among Christians (!).* The slaves are not free agents, and a dissolution by death is not more entirely without their consent and beyond their control than by such separation." In other words, this answer might have been briefly stated thus: "Neither law nor custom gives any protection to the slave in his conjugal relations; *therefore* neither ought religion to give him any such protection. The law of the land, *i. e.* the law of men, or American law, gives authority to the master to dissolve the conjugal connections existing between any of his slaves; according to this law, the parties may, at any moment, be torn asunder and separated for ever; *therefore* the law of God must be made to succumb to this law of man; and although we declare that the written Word of God is our only rule of faith, and although that Word distinctly says, that 'if a woman be married to another man while her husband liveth, she shall be called an adulteress,' and that 'the woman which hath an husband is bound by the law to her husband so long as he liveth,'\* nevertheless, in consideration of the peculiar circumstances of slaves in this country, we are of opinion that a female slave should *not* be called an adulteress, even though she be married to another man while her husband liveth; moreover, that the woman is bound to her husband only so long as her husband is able to live with her." The reader will observe that the Baptist authorities gave no reasons for their decision, but contented themselves with a simple solution of the question proposed. The Presbyterians, on the other hand,—who, it may be worth

\* Rom. vii. 2, 3.



while to mention, whilst thus condemning to a life of adultery and prostitution thousands and thousands of slaves in their communion, expelled one of their ministers both from the ministry and from the church for marrying a sister of his deceased wife,—enter into details, and assign two reasons for their religious sanction of bigamy; first, that to forbid second marriages in such cases would expose the parties concerned to strong temptations; and of this reason it is obvious to remark, that it applies to a thousand other cases of daily occurrence, besides those which arise from the particular cause here contemplated, viz. compulsory separation of husband and wife by the relentless hand of a slave-master; and secondly, that inasmuch as the masters would certainly not acquiesce in any strict interpretation of the marriage-vow and a consequent prohibition of bigamy and such like irregularities of practice, it would be very cruel for the ecclesiastical authorities to expose the slaves to church-censure for acting in obedience to their masters. They take it for granted that the slaves would obey their masters rather than the Church; and so they think it best that the Church should range herself at once on the side of the masters, even though by so doing she deliberately sanction sin. They do not for a moment contemplate the possibility of martyrdom on the part of the slaves, such as we read of in the annals of the early Church under circumstances not altogether dissimilar; and they are contented to shape their code of morality according to the opinions and practice of the world around them, rather than, by enforcing a stricter code of divine authority, to endanger their own popularity and diminish the number of their followers. This is far from being a new feature in the history of Protestantism; but it is not the less striking and important on this account. On the contrary, it is most interesting and instructive to note how this same feature of a disregard of the marriage-vow is perpetually re-appearing here and there, both in ancient and modern history, in connexion with various phases of Protestantism. The example of Luther, Melancthon, Bucer, and other leading lights of the Reformation, allowing the Landgrave of Hesse to have two wives at once, will at once occur to every reader; so also in our own country, the example of the wretched Cranmer marrying, divorcing, and re-marrying his royal tyrant-master, as often as that monster willed. Father Newman has somewhere hinted in one of his lectures at a secret invisible connexion between Protestantism and polygamy; and we have heard the insinuation attacked with the utmost indignation, and denounced as a most wanton insult and calumny. Yet these examples, and the decrees which we

have been now considering with reference to the marriage of slaves, abundantly establish its truth. Moreover, American Protestantism can furnish us with yet another example of the same thing from the history of its missions, which, though in some degree foreign to our present subject, is too important to be omitted. One of the little works before us, to which we have been indebted for many of the facts in this article,\* speaks of a certain "American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions," which the writer says is "next in importance to the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church; indeed, in many respects, it undoubtedly should take precedence, not only of the General Assembly, but of any other ecclesiastical association in the country." This Board was memorialised some six or seven years since, on occasion of its anniversary meeting, as to "whether polygamists should be admitted to the mission churches." "The subject was referred to an august committee, Chancellor Walworth, of New York, chairman. Expectation was every where alive. To the astonishment of some, the grief of many, and the horror of all but the Board, the committee reported in favour of polygamy, or at least against instructing the missionaries to exclude polygamists; and the report, after long discussion, was adopted *without a dissenting voice*; those opposing, if such there were, not choosing to register their testimony against it."

We have no space to enter fully into all the details of this history; a few particulars, however, will interest all our readers. It appears that previously to this public discussion of the question, and the authoritative decision thereupon, the question had been privately asked of the *Prudential Committee* of this Christian Board; a committee whose name is most singularly ominous and significant, and whose duties, we presume, are to solve difficult and delicate questions of conscience, to grant dispensations, and the like. In two several cases, missionaries in heathen lands wrote home to this committee to ask advice in this matter, whether or no polygamists were to be admitted into the mission churches; *and the Board refused to give advice.*

"This venerable body were utterly unable to decide the question, whether a sin, which in all Christian nations consigns a man to a felon's infamy and prison, should by the American Protestant Missionaries be admitted into the Christian Church. And so little interest did they take in the case, that the secretary declares he was profoundly ignorant of the subsequent disposal of the matter. In two *other* cases polygamists were certainly admitted into the mission churches; and not a hint of disapprobation was dropped by the Prudential Committee:

\* The Church as it is, &c.



and, for aught he knows, these two also came into the Church. He also states, that at a meeting of missionaries in India, the question was discussed, whether converted heathen polygamists should be admitted into the Church, *and the majority were in favour of so doing.*" Another gentleman who took part in the debate announced that concubinage was *allowed* in the West Indian Moravian Missions; and a third read "extracts from a letter of a Rev. Mr. Griffin, who went out as an independent missionary, sustained by certain churches in Litchfield county, Connecticut. Mr. Griffin declared that he found church members living in open fornication, that is, without marriage; that he at first hoped privately to persuade them to be married; but not succeeding, was forced to preach openly upon adultery. This 'raised a storm,' and *the people were sustained in their opposition by every Protestant missionary whom they consulted. These missionaries declared that the time had not come to make a stand against adultery!*"

We must yet make room for the arguments of two or three more of these Protestant theologians upon this subject. "Dr. Tyler said: The question is, shall we legislate for extreme cases? Discuss this question in any ecclesiastical body, and they wouldn't agree. I wouldn't say that in all cases it is wrong. Let the missionaries decide such cases. We too have weak consciences, as has been said on the other side. *We have as good a right to ask the Board to say that polygamy, in extreme cases, is right, as they have to ask the Board to say it is wrong.*

"Chancellor Walworth referred to the opening of Turkey to the Gospel, where polygamy is common, and said the case might arise there. In his State polygamy was felony; there it is lawful. *We couldn't decide it; the circumstances of the case must decide it.*"

In other words, this Protestant gentleman, professing, no doubt, to draw his religion from the Bible and the Bible only, and upbraiding his Catholic neighbours on the ground that they "teach for doctrines the commandments of men," yet deliberately propounds it as the duty of Christian missionaries, proceeding to preach the Gospel to a heathen country, that they should consult the existing state of things, the customs and laws of the people, and shape religion accordingly. The Christian religion is to be made to tolerate a plurality of wives, or to denounce it as a grievous sin and scandal, according to the habits of the country in which it is being preached! The divine law is to be regulated according to the human.

Nor is this the only instance in which this monstrous subversion of all religious principle has been solemnly adopted and systematically acted upon by different sects of Protestants in the New World, in connexion with matters bearing more immediately on the question before us,—of the evils of

slavery. In 1840, it was moved in the General Conference of the Methodist body, by the Rev. Dr. Few of Georgia, and the resolution was *adopted*, "that it is inexpedient and unjustifiable for any preacher to permit coloured persons to give testimony against white persons in any state where they are denied that privilege *by law*." This, be it remembered, is no law of the state; we mean, that this particular resolution which we have now quoted was not enacted in any secular assembly—such as the British House of Parliament, for example; an assembly formed of men of all kinds of religion, or of no religion at all, amongst whom the religious principle and high sense of duty of the *few* is overpowered perhaps, and rendered of no effect, through the sordid self-interest of the many,—but it is the decree of a professedly religious assembly; it is a canon of ecclesiastical discipline proposed and passed in a synod of Christian—we should have said, of Protestant—ministers; and it is designed to regulate the internal management of their own religious communion, a communion which embraced at that time no less than 80,000 persons of this very class, who were thus denied the right to testify against any white brother or sister who might grievously oppress and injure them. How eloquent a commentary on the texts which we have so often referred to, as to the abolition under the new law of the degrading distinctions between bond and free, and the equality before God of all mankind! With what spiritual unction must these ministers of the Gospel, on their return home to their coloured congregations, armed with the necessary authority to promulgate this decree of the synod,—with what unction must they have held forth upon the endearing relations of Christian brotherhood, choosing for their text, perhaps, "All things whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, do ye even so unto them!" If our readers were not weary of listening to the details of these atrocious decrees, passed by nominally Christian bodies, we could mention others of a similar kind; others, we mean, in which the same principle of subserviency of the divine to the human law is more or less distinctly acknowledged; such as, from the polygamy-loving Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, that "it is the duty of the Board to prosecute the work of saving souls, without attempting to interfere with the civil condition of society *any faster than the consciences of the people become enlightened*." It is not, then, the duty of the Christian Church to take the lead to rebuke the evil ways of the world, and to guide them into better courses, but only to be faithful in *following* the world, in *keeping pace* with its moral improvement.



What power has such a Church as this to contend with *any* social evil of real magnitude? If these are the religious bodies to which the slaveholders in the United States for the most part belong, what chance is there of the abolition, or even the mitigation of slavery being brought about in a healthy and peaceable way as the natural fruit of true Christian principles? Manifestly none. Protestant Christianity is the ally of the master, and the most cruel oppressor of the slave.

But it will be said, that though it is true that all these enormities have been committed by certain sections of the most important Protestant bodies in America, yet they have been met by very vehement protests on the part of other portions of the same bodies; so that it is not fair to lay to the charge of all what was really the act of *some* only, and was indignantly repudiated by others. We are well aware that there is a certain difference of opinion among the members of the various Protestant communities of America upon this subject, as indeed upon every other; but we observe this very significant phenomenon in these variations, viz. that though ostensibly of a moral character, they are co-extensive with certain territorial divisions, and seem to take their colouring, not from the higher religious tone of this or that individual, so much as from the accidental circumstance that his local *habitat* is at a certain convenient distance from the evil he protests against. It was very keenly and justly observed by one of the Presbyterian doctors who took part in the debates of the synod of 1843, that "the memorials which asked the Assembly to act in some way against slavery came not from those who were suffering under the evils of slavery, but from men in the free states." Those who lived at a distance from the evil, to whom it was not in any way a practical question, saw clearly enough, as they imagined, the wickedness of slavery; whilst of those who lived and laboured in the midst of it, the moral vision was far from being so acute. Just so those patrons of polygamy in the lands of the heathen protest most loudly against the patrons of slavery at home; and *vice versâ*, slaveholders, and supporters of slaveholders in the states, are perfectly scandalised at what they consider the immoral licenses in the matter of matrimony tolerated by the missionaries abroad; but where each man's daily work lies, there precisely he becomes blind to the particular evil which he ought to combat—he silently acquiesces in it, or even actively promotes it. Meanwhile the authorities who preside over both parties, the *prudential* committees of the respective bodies, very prudently enforce silence upon all, and give scope to any and every irregularity rather than run the risk of "disturbing the peace of

their Church." Moreover, it is to be observed that the protesting party have not, as far as we know, proceeded in any one instance really to break off from all communion with those who think differently from themselves on these matters. In the Presbyterian community certain local associations have ventured to address letters of remonstrance and friendly rebuke to the General Assembly; and the General Assembly, knowing their contents, have voted unanimously not to receive them! By this clever device, the northern churches relieve their consciences by testifying, the southern churches hold on to their slaves, and Christian fellowship goes on as before. The result is briefly described thus: "the local congregational associations cut off all connexion with the General Assembly 'as such,' but retain fellowship with the churches composing it: a singular operation in spiritual surgery." In the Methodist community there has been a more formal separation between the northern and southern churches, and it is sometimes stated that slavery was one of the principal elements in the dispute which engendered this schism. We do not know accurately all the particulars of the case, but there would certainly seem to be considerable exaggeration in this statement; for we find, first, that it was not the northern and anti-slavery churches who seceded from the southern and slave-supporting churches, but *vice versâ*; and secondly, several slave-states are retained in the northern division, so that the northern conference has still upwards of 4000 slaveholders, and about 30,000 slaves. We cannot therefore admit these empty protests and quasi-schisms as really absolving any portion of the Protestant churches in America from the guilt of indirectly, yet most powerfully, upholding the existing system of slavery in all its horrors. We repeat, then, the assertion with which we began, and which we think we have now sufficiently proved, viz. that Protestantism, as it exists in the United States, is the one chief obstacle to the mitigation and final abolition of slavery in that country; by deliberately sanctioning the sin of adultery among the slaves, when committed in obedience to the will of the master, it ignores, and, as far as its influence extends, annihilates all social relations among them, and so renders an amelioration of their lot in this respect more difficult, if not impossible; while by sanctioning in its churches and in the internal regulations of its discipline the degrading distinctions of caste, it stimulates and perpetually keeps alive the very root and principle of the whole institution.

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## IMPORTANT DISCOVERY OF FATHER SECCHI

RELATIVE TO THE INSCRIPTION ON THE CHAIR OF  
ST. MARK AT VENICE.

A VERY interesting discovery has lately been made at Venice by Father Secchi, of the Society of Jesus. This learned Orientalist was induced to visit Venice in order to examine the public libraries, with a view to obtain materials for an historical work upon the Council of Florence, on which he is engaged; and his search has brought to light so many interesting manuscripts connected with this subject, that his stay has been protracted far beyond his original intention. But in another and an unexpected way his residence in that city has been productive of good, and subservient to the cause of divine truth. It is unnecessary for us to remind our readers of the interest which attaches to the chair preserved in the treasury of St. Mark's Church at Venice, and which tradition declares to be the identical chair of the Evangelist St. Mark; since this most interesting relic, as well as the chair of St. Peter, preserved in the same city, has recently been made the subject of controversy before the English public.

For the sake of clearness, however, it may be well to call to their recollection that of the two chairs preserved at Venice, one claims to be that of St. Mark, and another is asserted to be the original chair of St. Peter brought from Antioch. The latter is preserved in the church of St. Peter, and upon the back of it appears an inscription in Cufic characters which is universally admitted to be Mahometan, and which Father Secchi informs us contains a verse from the Koran inculcating the duty of prayer for the dead. Of course there is some difficulty in accounting for such an inscription in such a position. It appears at first sight as though it must necessarily overthrow the claims of this relic to be considered authentic; and the difficulty seems increased tenfold when we are informed that in the Basilica of S. Lorenzo at Rome there exists another ancient chair, which is also said to be the chair of St. Peter from Antioch. We are still further informed that "it is beyond dispute" that the original chair of the Apostle, long revered at Antioch, was, together with numerous other relics of remote antiquity, broken to pieces and destroyed when that city fell into the power of the Mahometans. One would have thought that so many solid blows must long since have entirely demolished the pretensions of the chair

which is to be seen in the church of St. Peter at Venice. Nevertheless, ecclesiastical traditions have very often a vitality about them which can stand a good deal of critical and controversial hammering. And in the present instance the truth seems to be—we speak on the authority of Father Secchi, both here and throughout the whole of this article—that neither the chair at Venice nor the chair in the Basilica of S. Lorenzo at Rome, pretends, excepting only in a loose and colloquial way of speaking, to be the chair of Antioch; but that in both there exists a considerable fragment of the original chair, which must have been once broken up and divided; and that what was wanting in each instance to make a complete structure was made up of such materials as chanced to come most readily to hand. An examination of these several relics will shew in each case a particular portion composed of Phrygian marble, differing from the other marbles that have been made use of to complete the monuments. In the case of the chair at Venice, it is probable that the beauty of the arabesque pattern, which perhaps was not known to contain any inscription, was the sole cause why the headstone of a Mahometan grave should have been selected as a suitable ornament to form the back of an episcopal chair.

Having said thus much in order to avoid confusion, and to answer by anticipation objections that would otherwise be raised, we proceed to speak more particularly of the chair of St. Mark. It is upon this chair that the inscription occurs which is to be the subject of the present article, and which has never been hitherto explained in any satisfactory way. It has remained an enigma for the last two centuries, when it was first brought to light by the decay of the external covering (of wood inlaid with ivory) in which the marble chair had been enclosed. Many meanings have since been suggested, but apparently without any good foundation to support them; and none of them has gained any thing at all like universal credence. Father Secchi believes that he has now set this controversy at rest, by an interpretation which embodies a doctrine as well as records a fact, and which possesses an interest not alone for the city and the see of St. Mark, but for the whole Church of Christ. It is to this learned Father that we are indebted for the brief outline which we are about to lay before our readers; those who require a more exact and critical account must wait for the publication of a work which he is now engaged upon, and which will enter at length into all the various questions involved.

The first notice which occurs in history of the chair of St. Mark is in the account of the martyrdom of St. Peter of



Alexandria, who suffered under the Emperor Maxaminian, A.D. 310. It is related of him that so great was his humility, and so profound his reverence for the chair of St. Mark, from which so many of his holy predecessors had instructed their flock, that when he assisted in church at the divine office, he could never be persuaded to seat himself therein; he used to say that it appeared to him as if the chair was surrounded by a divine splendour. After the saint's martyrdom, the people obtained possession of his body; and having vested it in pontifical robes, they placed it in triumph in the seat which he had declared himself unworthy to occupy while living; after which, with lighted torches and branches of palm, amid clouds of incense and the sound of sacred songs, they bore it forth to burial. Surely none can desire a more eloquent and convincing testimony of the estimation in which this relic was held at Alexandria at the commencement of the fourth century.

There is an ancient tradition that the faith was first planted among the Veneti by the Evangelist St. Mark, who preached in the famous city of Aquilea; and this tradition receives some support from the testimony of St. Gregory Nazianzen, who speaks of St. Mark as having preached the faith to the Italians; an expression having evidently a different and wider sense than would be satisfied by admitting that he had accompanied St. Peter to Rome. When, therefore, Mahomet was in the midst of his career of conquest, and the sacred memorials of so many Christian cities had been desecrated, pillaged, and destroyed by his fanatical hordes—when especially the sacred treasures of Antioch had perished, and the venerable chair of St. Peter had not been spared, it is not surprising that precautionary measures were taken for placing in safety that other memorial of the apostolic age which existed at Alexandria; and where was it likely to be more securely guarded and more devoutly honoured than if committed to the keeping of those whose forefathers had been converted to the faith by the preaching of the Evangelist to whom it had originally belonged? When the whole of northern Italy had been overrun by the Arian heresy, this people had persevered in the true faith; and the little island of Grado, to which the See of Aquileja had been removed, was accordingly the spot fixed upon by the Emperor Heraclius in which to deposit the chair of Alexandria. After remaining at Grado for about two centuries, it was removed to the Basilica of St. Mark at Venice, A.D. 828, where it was placed over the high altar; and upon the erection of a modern tabernacle about two centuries ago, it was deposited in the treasury. The chair is cut out of a solid block of white marble; and, as has been before ob-

served, it was enclosed in an outer case, the gradual decay of which revealed the inscription which we must now proceed to describe.

The language of this inscription is Hebrew, and the characters in which it is written are those which were commonly used by the Egyptian Jews; that is to say, they are Aramæan, bearing a strong resemblance to the Palmyrene. Another peculiarity is, that they are written from left to right; and this has probably been one of the chief difficulties in deciphering them; for the characters themselves appear to be sufficiently sharp and distinct. That he might study the inscription at his leisure, Father Secchi caused an impression to be taken in wax; and as this process had the effect of transposing the letters, and brought the first letters in the inscription to take their proper place at the right instead of the left, the difficulty was at once solved, and the meaning of the words unfolded. Father Secchi has kindly furnished us with a copy of the inscription;\* but as we have no types which can reproduce it faithfully, our readers must be contented for the present with a translation of it, and await the publication of Father Secchi's own book, before they study it in its original characters. The following Latin translation is from himself; and we have done our best to render it accurately into English:

CATHEDRA . MARCI . EADEM . DIVINA . REGVLA . MEA . MARCI .  
MEI . (EST) . IN . AETERNVM . IVXTA . ROMAM .

*The Chair of Mark; the same my divine Rule and  
my Mark's: ever at Rome.*

It appears, therefore, that the inscription not only describes this chair as the very chair of St. Mark the Evangelist, but declares that the "divine rule" of him who wrote these lines was ever to be guided by the holy Roman See. These are strange words, indeed, to emerge just now from the darkness of eighteen centuries; and the divine rule is one which applies equally to the See of Westminster as to the See of Alexandria.

Both the characters in which the inscription is written, and the history of the chair itself, sufficiently attest its antiquity. Moreover, the familiar and affectionate form of address, "my Mark," naturally suggests to us that the author of these words had been personally known to the holy Evangelist; and as the Bishop Ananias, who succeeded St. Mark in the See of Alex-

\* The singular fact of the inscription being written from left to right is accounted for by Father Secchi as having been done in conformity to Christian custom; as being, in fact, a protest against Judaism.



andria, and occupied it for twenty-three years, was also of Jewish origin, it is not an improbable conjecture that it was he who caused these lines to be engraved upon the chair of his predecessor. If there be any bishop of the early Church in whom we should expect to find an affectionate and ardent zeal for the divine authority of St. Peter, that bishop would certainly be his beloved and faithful companion, St. Mark; and it appears as if the author of this inscription had been desirous of testifying to a teacher whom he deeply revered, how he had faithfully followed the lessons he had received from him; or, further still, it may perhaps be permitted us to suppose, that the "divine rule" which he records is a quotation of some oft-repeated words of St. Mark himself.

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## MADELEINE, THE ROSIÈRE.

### CHAPTER III.

OF all the many fêtes in France, there is not one more pleasing to behold, more beautiful in its object, than the fête of *la Rosière*. We do not quite despair some day of seeing it transplanted to our shores, when the good old times of Catholicity possibly may impress their stamp of virtuous emulation in the breasts of the village maid; when the farmer's daughter may not disdain the churn, or hold up her crochet-work or silken embroidery, with a proud toss of the head, when in the quiet simplicity of your heart you ask her, "Has she been a-milking?" Farmers' daughters do nothing of this now; but they ape their betters in all things,—dance polkas, play the piano, scream Italian, and (as a matter of course) are ignorant of and would mortally despise a *Rosière*. In France it is the earliest dream of a village maiden's heart, to bear off the palm of goodness. Unlike the prize of beauty, it excites no evil passions: the very object of desire quells all such. It is a prize of virtue, humility, industry, goodness, which the plainest may run for; happy the one who wins! Not alone is she crowned with roses, but a subscription-purse is raised for her, a gold chain given, and above all, amidst the tears of the whole congregation, in some quiet little rural chapel, *le bon père*, who has watched the training of this his favourite child and pupil, gives her his blessing, after delivering a feeling and perhaps most eloquent discourse. From the earliest days of childhood, Père Gallin had set his heart upon one day crowning little Madeleine, the poor orphan child. In the meantime, many

passed, of course, from their age, before her, and each one had been held up as an example to her, until the child's every thought was fixed, not on the purse or golden chain, but upon the wreath of roses. Her dream at length seemed certain of realisation; so pure, so good was Madeleine, that unanimously all elected her for the honour, to which election *le père* gave his conscientious assent. This was the streak of blue in Madeleine's clouded sky after Alexis' departure; for her sky was a very troubled one: the uncertainty of ever gaining his aunt's consent to their marriage, even ultimately; and then the many chances in a man's life for the first time quitting home for the busy world. True, she had been all to him in their village; but when he came to see so many fairer faces than her own—for though very fair in all other eyes, Madeleine had a humble opinion of her own charms, and this the farther enhanced them, as it lent so mild and gentle a look to her soft, down-cast eye. Surely the child born in sorrow bears that impression on her countenance; it never is joyous, like the one which has seen the light in bright sunshine. However, as the moment approached for the fête of the *Rosière*, a quiet joy shone on her open brow, where all was peace—the peace a good conscience gives. Then, too, she should no longer be quite a dependent for a fortune—though the kindness of the Bertrands made her feel that dependence but little—for she would have a purse of nearly twenty pounds; for the neighbouring ladies all subscribed to it, and the village was not very small, and all put their mite to this good act; a gold chain, too, would be given in the chapel, with due ceremony. All these thoughts so occupied her, that she passed over the fact more tranquilly than she would otherwise have done, that Alexis had not written for nearly a week. She spoke of it to Louise; but this loving friend strove to bring peace to her heart, by pointing out all the hurry, weariness, and toil of a soldier's march; for he was journeying onward every day farther from Nogent and Madeleine. Despite every argument in favour of patience, however, her heart began to beat more rapidly, and a little flush of anxiety was on her cheek as the second week crept on, and still no news from him. “Surely he must be ill?” she said anxiously to Louise; “and how shall we hear? His aunt will not tell us, even if she know; and Madame Bertrand, though so good and kind, sees nothing to be uneasy about. What can we do, Louise, *ma bonne* Louise?”

This good creature forbore to tell the anxious girl how troubled she herself felt, having written to him, unknown to any one, without receiving a reply; still she naturally did not suffer so much as Madeleine; she was older, and *only* a sister



though a much-attached one; and she argued, until she persuaded herself that his duties alone caused his silence.

Affairs stood thus, when a circumstance so painful to all occurred, that for a few days every other thought was set aside. Monsieur Bertrand was in the habit—a thing well known in the village—of collecting the rents of some houses he possessed in the neighbourhood at given times, and frequently these remained in his possession for days, until all were received, when he placed the sum in his lawyer's hands. On the day when the last rent had been paid him, their quiet house was entered in the night, and the whole amount carried off. It seemed the person or persons must have been well acquainted with the habits of the family and where the money was kept, or else have made minute inquiries; for nothing else was touched, but the bureau alone opened, and all taken. We are wrong in saying nothing else was stolen; there was a miniature, one of Madame Bertrand's mother, which she prized much; it was set in an old-fashioned setting resembling brilliants, but its actual value was nothing. The sum purloined amounted to about forty pounds; and this to persons of not large income was a considerable loss; though perhaps the most painful sensation, after all, was the idea that their quiet dwelling had been mysteriously entered by the midnight thief; such contact ever leaves a most agitating influence on the upright mind. Some short time before this took place, two men of suspicious appearance had been in the neighbourhood, and remained for some days at *L'Auberge à Bon Port*; as their papers were correct in the eyes of the gendarmes, nothing could be said about them, neither had Mdlle Lagune any right to complain, for they paid well; but there was that unmistakable air of Robert Macaireism about them, that all looked shyly upon them. After the robbery had been committed, Mdlle Lagune was the first to remember that they had made especial inquiries about the Bertrands, and, strange to say, of Madeleine, as to who she was—what her age, name—was she any relative, &c. There were others to confirm this strange account, for they had been particularly inquisitive about the girl. Now though no one could, however malignant, for an instant suspect that she had any knowledge of these men, still to a sensitive mind how painful a thing it was, in any way to have her name implicated with such characters! Madeleine suffered keenly; Madame Bertrand, the first annoyance passed, laughed at the child's susceptibility, and spoke more lightly than perhaps she might otherwise have done of the whole affair, to endeavour to tranquillise her. Monsieur Bertrand, though an excellent man, had less delicacy of

feeling than his wife; indeed, Madeleine's position was so totally forgotten by him, loving her, as he did, like a child, that he could see no possible cause for her annoyance: neither was there in fact; but we sometimes have these mysterious and unaccountable feelings of overwrought delicacy; besides, Mdlle Lagune had spoken to every one of the men inquiring about her; so much so, that many a good-natured jest from a homely neighbour of, "Ha, Mdlle *la Rosière*! so you have acquaintances thieves, have you? Don't let them steal your fortune or gold chain, however." And the poor girl struggling to seem calm, oppressed by such jests and Alexis's strange silence, would creep away and weep bitterly. To one only person could she open her whole heart; not even to Louise could she do this, but to *le bon Père* Gallin. One day she sought him, more oppressed in heart than ever; it wanted about a week of the fête; she told him her many sorrows, which the good man endeavoured to lighten to her young bosom; then she spoke of the mysterious terror this robbery had inspired her with—a terror as though she had in some way caused it. He laughed at these ideas, attributing them to the chatterings of Mdlle Lagune and her set; then assuming a more serious tone, and taking her hand, he said, "My child, I have long been going to tell you something which I think you ought to know: it is rather a painful subject, and I have consequently deferred it; but as recent events have engendered reflection in your young mind, better at once tell you. Madeleine, I believe you have a father living."

Madeleine turned pale and trembled; she knew enough of her own history (Louise had confided it to her) to look upon his memory, for such she had deemed it, with distrust and horror: his cruel desertion of her poor mother was the cause of this. Now to know that he was in existence created a chill at her heart like death: she felt as if she were already claimed by him, and subject to his control. Père Gallin continued, "From all your unfortunate mother told me, I was led to doubt whether she had had sufficient proof of his death; consequently I made every inquiry, which ended in my positively discovering that the man killed by the falling of the tree was not your father, though he had been occupied as a wood-cutter. I traced him from place to place: the last was to the employ of a wood-merchant in Paris, whose service he quitted suddenly, saying he had inherited some property near Rouen. I wrote to a friend there, but every trace failed; this is four years since: what has become of him, I know not. I must tell you, my child, that from the character I heard of him every where, I deemed it better to keep all this knowledge to myself. I



do not mean to say he bore a dishonest name, but a wild unsettled one. I have friends still making inquiries; and should we discover him, Madeleine, I will tell you."

Madeleine was weeping; she scarcely knew why.

"Do not weep, my child," said the kind man; "it should comfort you to know a parent exists; for as the old saying has it, blood is thicker than water. Though Monsieur and Madame Bertrand have been as parents to you, yet some day it may solace you to find a father, and let us hope, with increasing years, a good man."

"I will hope so, father," she answered, trying to still her tears; "but I am so sorrowful, that every thing terrifies me now." Some time longer he spoke to her, and the heart beneath the influence of his kindness, and the spell which those whom Heaven sends to comfort us in our afflictions ever exercises over our minds, she grew almost cheerful, and cast her care for awhile behind her.

"You did not tell me where you last heard of my poor father," she said.

"He was with Monsieur Lafon, wood-merchant, Quai St. Michel," was the reply.

"I will pray for him," she said, bending her fair head in humility and faith. "*Le bon Dieu* will perhaps hear a child's prayer for her father."

Taking leave of the Père, she proceeded homewards more cheerful and hopeful.

#### CHAPTER IV.

Monsieur and Madame Bertrand's house was in profound repose, to all appearance, at ten o'clock on the evening of this day; but Madeleine sat some time after this hour at her window, which looked into the garden: the girl of scarcely sixteen seemed at one step to have grown to mature womanhood; so much does thought call forth all the energies, and ripen the mind's half-formed ideas. Above all rose her father, even before Alexis; she felt less lonely; she pondered whether it were quite right on her part to remain in inactive comfort, when possibly a parent might be in want or trouble. "I will ask Père Gallin," she mentally said; "I know he will guide me in what I ought to do."

Thus thinking, she rose to undress for the night. She had been sitting without a light; as she quitted the window and raised a hand to close the lattice, a shadow seemed to glide beneath the shade of a wide-spreading apple-tree in full blossom. She started, drew back, looking fixedly on the spot,

but nothing more appeared to alarm her; still the heart beat; and hastily drawing her white dimity curtain before the window, she forgot the most material thing, namely, to fasten the lattice. Young heads sleep heavily, more so in sorrow than in joy; this latter may give them dreams of feather-weight; sorrow is a plummet, and bears down the eyelid. Madeleine sank into a deep heavy sleep, and dreamed of her father; he was beside her, and in her great anxiety to distinguish his features, the spell on her spirit broke, and starting up in fear, she became conscious, to her horror, that she was not alone in that dark chamber. Her alarm prevented her from uttering more than an exclamation of intense terror as she sat up in bed.

"Hush!" whispered a voice, a well-remembered one, even though so lowered in its tone as to be scarcely recognisable, except to her ear. "Hush, Madeleine! if you betray me, I am lost."

"Alexis!" she uttered; "Alexis! you here, and thus! What has occurred? Speak, for you inspire me with a fear I cannot express." As she spoke she slid from the bed, and hastily throwing a dress around her, sat shivering with alarm on the side of it.

"Madeleine," he whispered, again taking her cold hand in his own, clammy like death, "Madeleine, you once said you loved me above all on earth; I come this night to ask you again, is it so? Are you certain, certain that nothing can ever wean your affections from me?"

"Nothing, Alexis," she breathed through her chattering teeth. "I have told you so before; you should have believed me; but surely you have come this night for some other cause than to ask a question so often answered before?" Even as she spoke, she wondered at her own coldness; she who would once have flown to meet his welcoming embrace, now sat cold and motionless; he too was changed and paralysed; it was like a meeting of spirits, not flesh and blood.

"I want you to tell me, to assure me," he impatiently cried, raising his voice higher, "that nothing shall ever part us, not if you meet your father."

"What do you know of him?" she asked in wild surprise.

"This, that you will meet soon; he may not seek you, but you will meet."

"Strange, strange," she uttered, "that you should speak of that which only was uttered to me this day! but let this tranquillise you, dearest—nor father, friends, fate—nothing shall part us."

"You have forgotten one thing in your enumeration, Madeleine—*crime*, would not *that* part us?"



"Alexis!" she almost shrieked, clasping both his cold hands in hers, "do not drive me mad; you cannot be guilty of crime!"

"I knew it!" he answered despondingly, endeavouring to withdraw the hands she still clasped; "let me go; for you I have committed it, and you turn from me; let me go; I can add another to the one already done, and die!"

"My love, my affianced husband—my all—" sobbed the suffering girl, dropping before him and clinging to his knees in frantic energy, "I will never desert you. If you have done a wrong act, I will stand by, and soothing, win you to repentance and right; but never leave you, Alexis—never leave you."

"Thanks, my Madeleine," he replied, in the same unchanged hopeless tone; "now I can return to my regiment for awhile; only for awhile, for *soon I shall be free.*" These last words he whispered scarcely audibly in her ear.

"Then you have not deserted?" she asked in amazement; "I thought this was your crime."

"Desertion!" and he laughed hoarsely. "Desertion! child's play. No; I am here with the consent of my superiors; I was taken ill, and they gave me a month's leave; but I have not shewn myself yet *here*, you will understand why *soon*; the fact is, I could not leave you; you were surrounded by so many temptations. I know Louis Debrets loves you; how, then, could I leave you for perhaps seven long years? Madeleine, my crime is *theft*; I robbed this house last week, and have lain hidden ever since; the notes, however, are changed into good louis-d'or, and soon I shall be free; then I will save—save—save every sous, and repay back the forty pounds anonymously when you are mine."

The horror-stricken girl shrank back from his clasping arm which essayed to detain her; she was speechless, but the heart beat quickly and convulsively.

"Now, dearest," he continued, without appearing to notice her agony, "I must go; I am expected somewhere, and the sunrise must not find me here; but, before I go, swear not to betray me to any one, not to speak of this, not to hint it; not, above all, to the Père Gallin."

"Oh!" almost shrieked Madeleine, "I cannot deceive him; it would be sacrilege."

"Are you mad?" he exclaimed; "why, he would in some manner make it known, and I be lost."

"He would not, Alexis, he would not; but I dare not bear the burden alone of this heavy secret and crime."

"A crime!" he added, in a low tone of bitterness;

“crime for you, and you will betray and condemn me *everlastingly*; mind that, girl; for the day it becomes known, I die. Keep the secret, and I will in a short time restore all; besides, the error is mine, not yours; think to what an eternal fate you doom me; think, girl—think, Madeleine, you whom I love so madly—think, and swear to keep the secret.”

He clasped her hands in both of his, and her trembling, scarcely articulating lips repeated after him a solemn oath of secrecy. As the last words were uttered he stooped, and pressing his lips on her brow, whispered—“Now, farewell awhile, my own love; I must fly; were I found here, discovery would be inevitable; I shall soon be free, and near you once more. Farewell, my own love, *la Rosière*; on that day of rejoicing remember me, your Alexis.”

She saw him creep towards the window; he turned, waved his hand, stepped through the lattice, and descended a ladder placed outside. With straining eyes she watched all this, and then sank back fainting on her pillow. It appeared to her imagination, on surveying the events we have related, that this insensibility had been succeeded by a feverish sleep; for she started from a confused dream of other things, to recall, after awhile, the whole of the painful scene with Alexis.

At first she felt disposed to imagine it the hallucination of slumbering fancy; but when she started at an early hour from her bed, awakened by the singing of the still more material bird beneath her window, there stood an unmistakable evidence of her nocturnal visitor: a ladder was placed against the wall, her lattice open, and on the ledge inside lay a bouquet of flowers still fresh and unfaded. Madeleine raised them to her lip, but ere they touched it the first thought of mysterious happiness at his presence was chased by the memory of his crime, and with a shudder she flung them from her; then a second thought arose within her—she must remove all evidence of his visit, which would tend to betray and condemn him. As she prepared to do this, the remembrance of the oath extorted from her arose in her mind, and with that recollection the last ray of comfort forsook her, for she had resolved upon laying the whole affair before her guide in all things, Père Gallin; now that was impossible, she had solemnly sworn secrecy for awhile, especially to him. The weeping, agitated girl opened her door gently, and creeping down stairs stole into the garden; beneath her window were the prints of a man's footsteps in the soft earth; these she effaced carefully with a rake, and removing the ladder carried it into an out-house from whence it had been taken. This circumstance alone would have been convincing proof, had any been



needed, of Alexis's presence; for often had he brought the ladder from its accustomed place to gather some ripe fruit for her, or else arrange the vine and clematis which clustered round the window he had entered so daringly the last night. Even before the servant rose, every trace had disappeared, and the truly wretched girl was sitting on the edge of her bed in solitude and terror, weeping bitterly.

Alexis had argued with her, and pointed out that it was no crime of hers; that she was quite innocent: consequently she endeavoured so to persuade herself. But there is a little inward monitor which never deceives us; she felt that it was an error on her part, the concealment; yet how break her oath? Poor Madeleine, with no one to guide, nothing to direct or counsel but her own uninformed though upright mind, grew hourly more feverish and uneasy. All noticed this; and the continued silence of Alexis was by Louise deemed a sufficient excuse. Monsieur and Madame Bertrand forgot their young days of love, and overlooking the fact of his prolonged silence, attributed her restless state to the nervousness natural to a young girl going for the first time to play a prominent part in a public ceremony; and the very means they took of re-assuring her made her position more painful; for from morning till night she heard nothing else spoken of but the coming honour, by her, as they expressed it, so well deserved. Her heart said otherwise; for she could no longer lay it bare in all candour to the one who had instructed her from infancy. Before the day of the ceremony, of course it became necessary that she should approach the confessional, and with pure clear conscience receive her *Rosière's* crown. The war within her was a fearful one. How tell *le père* that she was bound by a solemn oath not to divulge a crime? how conceal it? At last the sophistry of Alexis's arguments prevailed; she had been so much accustomed to look up to him in all things, as one superior to herself, and on whose judgment she relied when embarrassed, that this at last prevailed over her own rectitude of decision, and she persuaded herself against the promptings of her conscience, and kept silence about his visit and crime. "After all," she said to herself, "I have done no ill; I am not bound in charity to reveal the faults of others."

Of course this maxim is most true; but circumstances alter cases; and it would have been better to appeal to the direction of another, more competent to guide her than she was to lead herself in so serious an affair.

CHAPTER V.

None but the wretched Madeleine herself knew her deep anxiety as the day approached for the fête. Every moment since that fatal night she had been hoping to see Alexis arrive; hoping and dreading—for his freedom would be purchased by the loss of his soul's purity and uprightness; still she longed to see and urge upon him some speedy method of restitution and repentance. But time flew, and he neither came nor wrote; and the evening before the fête arrived. As she looked upon her white dress of purity and truth, a cold shudder crept over her; the heart disavowed the justice of the robe; she argued in her own favour, but conscience said, "There is one hidden spot wherein you have tacitly been deceiving."

The morning came, and a bright joyous sun lit up the scene. There were bands of village musicians, who if not worthy of exalted places in an orchestra, assuredly made up for want of immense talent by their heartiness and sincerity in summoning all to attend upon the *Rosière* of that day. Madeleine could scarcely walk down the stairs when Louise came as her handmaiden to summon her; she, in her ignorance, attributed much of the other's agitation to timidity and her naturally retiring disposition. These might once have acted upon her feelings; but every thing else was absorbed in the thought, the undying thought, "I am not worthy of this!"

At last she reached the street—or road, as, from its quietness, it rather deserved to be called. Madame Bertrand had kissed her half an hour before, as she confided her to Louise, bidding her be brave; and with her husband and several neighbours proceeded in advance to the village church, where the ceremony would take place.

The road before the house was one motley crowd of persons in their gayest attire; and the bands played—different airs, 'tis true; but who cared? who listened? they enlivened the scene, and that was all which was required. As the *Rosière* appeared, a loud shout greeted her; she looked very pale, pale almost as the white ribbons in her little cap.

"Lean on me, *ma fille*," whispered Louise. "Poor child, you are trembling; there, I know what you are thinking of, 'if he were here!' but don't fret; some day he will be beside you for even a happier day than this."

Madeleine gasped for breath.

"Mademoiselle Madeleine," said a young man stepping forward with a timid air, holding a bouquet in his hand,



"will you oblige me, and wear these flowers to-day? I have chosen the best I could find any where; I know you like white roses, and they are fitting for this fête."

She gazed on them with a haggard eye—they reminded her of the bouquet Alexis had left on her window; she took them, however, with a trembling hand.

"Thank you, Louis Debrets," she said with an effort; "I will wear them."

"Those of some one else would have been more acceptable, whom I know," he added in a low tone; "but he is not here to give them, so I must be his substitute. Don't be angry at what I say, Mademoiselle; you will understand what I mean soon; don't think me jealous; I know you love him, so there's no hope for me, and he loves you, *and will redeem his promise soon*, and come to you."

Madeleine shrank back aghast on Louise's arm; there was a significance of manner about this youth, which convinced her that he was by some means cognisant of Alexis's visit to her, possibly of his crime. Though well aware that the two had been bosom friends until a rivalry created a coolness, still she could not imagine that Alexis would confide his dreadful secret to Louis.

As this latter drew back amidst the crowd, staggering beneath her emotions, she allowed herself to be surrounded by her white-clad companions and led towards the church. The youth, extreme beauty, piety, and above all, peculiarity of her orphan state, had interested all the neighbourhood in Madeleine's favour; consequently the church was crowded, and the bright sun shone through the windows on the well-dressed persons assembled not only from the immediate neighbourhood, but the surrounding country seats. The curé stood at the altar, rejoicing too in the tribute paid to the excellence of his protégée of election. At last the bands sounded without, children entered first, two and two, scattering flowers before the following cluster of girls, in the midst of which Madeleine advanced up the nave. There was a murmur of admiration as she did so, for her nervous excitement added fresh charms to her beauty; she looked flushed, and the generally mild blue eye was flashing and wandering around; but as she advanced towards the altar, the whole countenance changed, and she became deadly pale and saddened. She knelt down outside the rails surrounded by her companions, and *le bon curé* with more than even usual fervour pronounced a blessing upon all, and especially on the *Rosière*, who knelt there to receive the reward of her great merit. Then with a deep sonorous voice he commenced a

discourse upon the occasion of that meeting, exhorting all to strive in pious emulation for the crown of merit in the succeeding year, then about to be awarded to the one there awaiting it. As he spoke with fervour and earnestness many wept, Madame Bertrand audibly so; but hers were tears of rejoicing and affection; her care of years for that orphan girl was amply rewarded at that moment. Madeleine's eyes were dry, again her cheek had flushed, and the breath came oppressively from her bosom as she concealed her face in her handkerchief. At last the discourse was ended, and *le Curé* descending from the altar took her by the hand with a cheering smile, and led her trembling steps towards the lady appointed by her position to give the awarded gifts.

"Courage, my child," he said; "do not tremble thus; I am near to support you; take courage, *ma bonne Madeleine*."

Almost unconscious, she was led forward; and kneeling before *la Comtesse de Guaie*, her knees clung to the ground, and her hands were clenched, not clasped together.

"Poor child," said that lady, "you are agitated; there, hold up your head;" and she raised the chin, and patted the fair but feverish cheek; then loosening her hold, she placed, with many cheering words, the wreath of fresh white roses on her head, and the chain around her neck. Madeleine was as a statue, and essayed in vain to hold the purse tendered to her grasp. "Poor child, how timid she is!" said *la Comtesse*. "*Monsieur le Curé*, pray take it for her."

*Monsieur Gallin* did as requested, at the same time encouragingly placing a hand on Madeleine's drooping head. "And here, *ma bonne petite fille*," said a lady stepping from her seat, "here are a pair of earrings for you, for I often heard how good and virtuous you were, an example for all to imitate; come, hold up your head—you have nothing to bow it down for—and let me put them in your ears."

And the fair hands adorned the now weeping girl with those much-treasured ornaments of the French peasant, long gold drops. As Madeleine's head was raised, drop after drop fell cold and heavily from her eyes; there was no sob, no contortion of muscle; they fell like the heavy drops preluding a coming storm, when skies lighten, and Heaven's angry voice is heard in condemning thunder. At last Madeleine was once more kneeling before the altar, and the solemn benediction commenced which was to terminate the fête in its more serious character, and give up the assembled villagers to their dance on the green or *place*. Of all in that church, perhaps but one felt real envy; for with the young there was hope for the next



year, and good resolutions with many, coupled with the only innocent ambition, that of excelling others in doing well and rightly; but one felt *real envy*, and it was the gratuitous envy of a bad heart; for she, Mademoiselle Lagune, was not of an age to aspire to the title conferred on Madeleine, but she had from her infancy hated that girl, and now shook her malignant head, whispering to a neighbour, "Look at the conceited upstart, how she tries to seem humble and modest, though I know her bosom is in a glow of gratified vanity! Crying, too! what a comedy! crocodile tears! and to think of her daring to aspire to my Alexis! Marry him, indeed! but we shall see, we shall see!" And her face glowed with indignation at the idea.

The Benediction proceeded. At the Litany, the girl kneeling next to Madeleine remarked afterwards that she seemed to cling convulsively to the rails as she uttered the prayer in a suffocating voice, "*Ora pro nobis.*" The last hymn was sung, the Benediction given, when, as *le Curé* turned to leave the altar, Madeleine rose frantically, and then dropping on her knees exclaimed, with clasped hands—

"My father! Monsieur le Curé! *mon bon père*, forgive me! I am not worthy; I have deceived you all; I have sinned deeply; take back all, all." And with trembling hands she almost tore the earrings from her ears, the chain from her neck, and lastly the wreath of white roses, casting each on the floor of the sanctuary, the railing to which stood open for Monsieur Gallin to pass through.

A general consternation pervaded the assembled congregation, which was retiring; all turned, and those who had left the place to await the procession outside, rushed hurriedly in again.

"Oh, my father!" she sobbed, grasping the border of the curé's cassock as he stood beside her in horror, "I might try to deceive you, and all, but I could not *Him*." And she fixed her tearful eyes on the tabernacle in terrified grief.

"Madeleine, *ma fille*," he exclaimed, taking her hand and standing over her, "come to yourself, you must be mad; what can you have done? you exaggerate some slight fault; what can *you* have committed so grave?"

"My child, my dear child," sobbed Madame Bertrand, clasping her in her arms. "Oh, Monsieur le Curé, do not think it; she must be mad; what can she have done?"

"I insist upon her telling," exclaimed Mademoiselle Lagune, who had drawn near; but no one heard her. "I knew it, I knew it," she continued in glee to her neighbour; "didn't I tell you she was a hypocrite? ah! she never deceived me;

poor, foolish Madame Bertrand, to have nurtured this snake in her bosom !”

She had reason for this last sentence in her gossips' eyes, when Madeleine, turning from Madame Bertrand's motherly embrace, raised her clasped hands to the curé, and implored in agony—

“Ask her, *ma bonne mère*, to pardon me, for 'tis against her I have been most guilty and ungrateful ; I know all about the robbery of her house !”

“You, Madeleine !” burst involuntarily from Madame Bertrand and the curé at the same moment, whilst a cold shuddering exclamation was breathed by all around.

“I was innocent of all knowledge of it till a week since,” she uttered hurriedly, “and then it was confided to me ; and in my anguish, scarcely knowing what I did, I bound myself by oath not to reveal it, and I have been wretched ever since. But I could bear the burden no longer ; come what may, I have cast it from me !”

“And you have done well, Madeleine,” said the curé gravely ; “but something more remains to complete the act ; you must here, before all, name the robbers, and how you became acquainted with them. You owe this to your own reputation, which I sincerely trust will come clear and pure out of this sad affair.”

“Were she lost, quite lost,” urged la Comtesse de Guaie, who had drawn near, in a deprecating tone, “she would not have thus accused herself.”

“I trust so, I hope so,” answered he gravely.

“I am sure of it,” cried the generous little Madame Bertrand, taking her shrinking hand ; “poor child, she has been led into this cruel position.”

“Make her tell the name of her accomplice,” cried Mdlle Lagune in her shrill tone.

“You had better tell all now, dear child,” said her foster mother ; “tell all, and clear yourself ; it will prevent ill-nature and malevolence.”

She had recognised the voice of the last speaker. We have not spoken of Louise, who stood beside the stricken girl, endeavouring to comfort and sustain her.

“Yes, Madeleine, you must name the thief, and how you are acquainted with the whole affair,” said the Curé. “This sacred edifice should witness your first step towards repentance, at the feet of Him whom you have offended :” he turned sadly towards the altar.

There was a pause. Madeleine looked up, her face was ghastly, she turned towards Louise ; the look was so deprecating



ting, so peculiar, that this latter borrowed its shade, and became livid with the sudden fear, as yet without form, at her heart. For some moments Madeleine was silent, her eyes raised to the altar, her lips moving; at last turning the former to the Curé's face, she uttered, "The thief was Alexis Vallette!"

A wild shriek burst from Mademoiselle Lagune. "'Tis false! 'tis a base fabrication invented to ruin him from spite!" she exclaimed.

Some one fell heavily to the ground; it was Louise fainting; but Madeleine never saw her, she was too much absorbed in her painful accusation against the man she loved.

"Remember, Madeleine Frémont," said the Curé sternly, "in whose presence you are, and tell all fully and candidly."

No one had noticed Madame Bertrand, whose trembling hands held a letter she had just taken from her pocket. After a few moments' thought, Madeleine, still kneeling, having solemnly promised to speak all the truth, related her midnight interview with Alexis, and his promise to return soon free.

"There is no proof; 'tis a falsehood!" again shrieked his aunt.

"Hush, silence!" exclaimed Père Gallin sternly.

"Alas! alas!" ejaculated Madame Bertrand, "I fear 'tis too true; for here is a letter I only received this morning from Alexis Vallette, written hurriedly, saying he would explain his long silence—a silence which has surprised us all—and begging me to cheer up Madeleine, as he was coming in a few days free, having found a substitute, hoping to remove all obstacle to his marriage with Madeleine."

We will sum up the conclusion of this scene in as few words as possible. Mademoiselle Lagune called loudly for Louis Debrets, who was known as an intimate friend of her poor maligned Alexis; but he was sought for in vain. After giving Madeleine the flowers, he had disappeared; no one had seen him in or near the church. This confirmed the idea of Alexis's guilt; the other had purposely concealed himself, having, perhaps, though unnoticed, heard Madeleine's accusation. Who shall paint her deep affliction? Called upon in conscience to accuse, perhaps condemn her lover, the unhappy girl was bowed to the earth. Obligated to bring all proof forward against him in cruel evidence, she spoke of the flowers he had left in her room; these she had buried in a corner of the garden, to destroy every indication of his visit, and there they were found, faded and decaying, the bouquet of white tea-roses, of which she was so fond and which Alexis was wont to present her with. On closely examining the

ground, the prints were still perceptible where the ladder had indented it.

Mademoiselle Lagune first threw herself into a violent passion, and then into hysterics, and thus she was carried home. Poor Madeleine was taken charge of by la Comtesse de Guaie, and in her carriage driven home to Madame Bertrand's, more dead than alive. No good, kind heart could blame her; for the self-accusation attested her repentance of any participation in the forced concealment of the crime of another. The Curé accompanied her; all tried to soothe, except Monsieur Bertrand: though an excellent man, yet he was rather narrow-minded; he blamed her, without well knowing why, and did not scruple in shewing it. Poor girl, she heard it; and it confirmed a previously conceived idea, of which more in the next chapter.

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### Reviews.

#### M. GUIZOT'S APPEAL TO OUR COMMON CHRISTIANITY.

*Du Protestantisme et de toutes les Hérésies, dans leur rapport avec le Socialisme: précédé de l'Examen d'un Ecrit de M. Guizot.* Par M. Auguste Nicolas.

WE had occasion, when noticing the Abbé Gerbet's able papers upon the connexion between Rationalism and Communism, to point out the equal applicability of his argument to Protestantism, on account of the rationalistic principle upon which it is based. Those who may wish to see this subject fully and ably treated have now the opportunity of consulting the thoughtful and eloquent pages of M. Auguste Nicolas, to whom Catholics already owe a debt of gratitude as the author of the *Etudes philosophiques sur le Christianisme*. The volume now before us sprang out of a pamphlet written with the view of discussing the principles and propositions contained in a short paper of M. Guizot's, prefixed to his collection of *Méditations et Etudes morales*, which pamphlet M. Nicolas has now reprinted as an introduction to his own work. The author was led to this fuller development of his subject from reasons which he details with much modesty in his preface, but which need not detain us here; and he takes occasion at the same time to speak of M. Guizot in terms of much respect and tender forbearance; sentiments with which he seems to be very generally regarded by French Catholics,



partly owing to a marked improvement in the tone of feeling evinced in his later productions when touching on religious matters, and partly to the candour with which he makes certain admissions, destructive no doubt of his own line of argument, but creditable to his good faith and sincerity, and giving a hopeful pledge of further progress on the road to truth.

In the paper in question, which M. Nicolas here reproduces previously to analysing its contents, M. Guizot calls upon all Christian communions to unite, on such common ground as they hold, to oppose the flood of Rationalism, Unbelief, Pantheism, and Scepticism, which, with their genuine and logical productions, Socialism and Communism, menace to engulf, not Christianity alone, but society itself. Against this evil, putting aside all dogmatic differences, he would have Protestants and Catholics unite, upon the broad principle of belief in the supernatural order and divine revelation, to combat the common enemy. In the course of a few short pages he exhibits much good feeling and many glimpses of truth, clothed in beautiful language; but we need hardly add, that his argument is in the same proportion weak and inconsistent. It would be incompatible with our limits to analyse his argument ever so slightly. We must content ourselves with a cursory glance.

Our author undertakes to establish three truths: 1st, that "the distinction between those who believe and those who do not believe, between Christians and philosophers, is false and vain, if it be any other distinction than that which subsists between the disciples of authority and the partisans of free inquiry;" 2dly, that "the principle of authority in religious matters admits of no compromise with the principle of liberty,—submission to divine authority must be absolute, or it is nugatory;" and 3dly, as the consequence of these two propositions, "that M. Guizot's contemplated alliance between the disciples of authority and the partisans of free inquiry is false in its principle and chimerical in its object."

M. Guizot had started with asserting, that in the supernatural order man's province was to submit. M. Nicolas takes him at his word, and inquires, "What, then, is the point on which we differ?"

"This difference," he continues, "is to be found in the object of this submission and the subject of this authority, that is, in this very submission and authority; for submission without an object, and authority without a subject, are a merely nominal submission and authority. Now what is our object of submission, our subject of authority? For us Catholics it is the supernatural order *taught* by the Church, that is, by an authority of the same order, external to us,

visible, living, distinct, independent of us, in order that we may be able to depend on it.

"For M. Guizot and the Protestants it is the supernatural order *not taught*, and consequently known immediately, conceived immediately, by the human mind.

"This supernatural order therefore exists or does not exist, is after this sort or that, in the exact measure of the knowledge which the human mind can form to itself concerning it. Is it not, therefore, palpable to all, that the submission of the reason in this case has no real object, since its pretended object, the supernatural order, depends, as concerns the knowledge of it, on that same reason which ought to depend upon it? All authority ought to be distinct and independent of the being who owes submission to it, if such authority and submission are to have any reality in them. You will reply, the supernatural order is independent of me. Yes, but not the knowledge of it; without which it is, with respect to you, as if it were not. This knowledge, the work of your reason, depends on the weakness of that reason, and is subject to all its vicissitudes; so far is it from exercising any dominion over it, or regulating it by a superior and distinct teaching, as in the case of the Church's teaching to Catholics.

"And let not the Protestant think to escape from this argument by producing the Bible as the superior and distinct object of his submission. I say of the Bible what I have said of the supernatural order,—it is what the knowledge and interpretation of it make it to be: now it is you yourself who make out for yourself both the knowledge and interpretation of it; therefore your submission has no real object.

"What is the meaning of believing in the supernatural order, or believing in the Gospel, if we do not know what it is we are to believe therein? In order that the mind may truly submit, it needs to be held and restrained by a fixed belief, determined by an external and distinct authority; else it falls back on itself, and feeds on its own opinions, which it will ever find it impossible to impose either on others or on itself, because it was, and always must remain, the author of them."

Thus there is no real distinction in *principle* between Protestants and those unbelieving philosophers against whom M. Guizot would have Catholics and the various Protestant sects to combine.

"The difference," continues M. Nicolas, "between the philosopher and the Christian consists not only in the object, but in the principle of action of the mind. Their difference does not merely consist in the fact that the one admits not, and that the other does admit, a supernatural order; but in that the one has an opinion and the other a belief; an opinion, that is, a view of one's own; a belief, that is, an adhesion to what comes from another. The one walks in ways of his own invention, the other in those which divine teaching has traced out for him."



This is a point very necessary to be insisted on in these days. There is a certain section of our Anglican neighbours who are constantly putting in a plea, not merely to be looked upon by us with a favourable eye from the large amount of Catholic truth which they admit, but to be considered as differing altogether in principle from other Protestants, nay, as not to be regarded as Protestants at all. They are, they assert, Catholics in point of fact; they can accept (so they imagine at least) the faith of the primitive ages; they can even agree well enough with what they call a moderate Catholic of the present day, with a Gallican, for instance; and were it not for modern exaggerations and developments, for ultramontanism and so forth, they could conscientiously join the Roman Catholic Church as she now exists; they could even give in their adhesion to her, in spite of her being so *very* Roman, if they might be allowed to make certain reservations of their own, which reservations, after all, would affect only a few points, upon which they are sure neither St. Peter nor St. Paul would have required any declaration on the part of their converts; nay, they feel pretty confident that, had the matter been laid before the unprejudiced minds of the Apostles, their bias would have been in favour of the Anglican view rather than the modern Roman. The Anglican *view*; yes, that very word speaks volumes; it is thoroughly uncatholic; it is pre-eminently Protestant; it includes the whole Protestant spirit, it excludes the true Catholic principle. We willingly and cordially admit that there are wide distinctions to be made among Protestants; we cordially confess, adopting the words of our author when speaking of the space which separates the Rationalist from the conscientious Protestant—such as M. Guizot—“we admit that the interval is immense” between the Protestant who abhors the doctrines of our holy Church, and him who is attracted towards them, and in a great measure accepts and approves of them; “but what we do not admit”—we again use M. Nicolas’s words—“is, that it is nothing more than an *interval of opinion* (the italics are our own) of the same nature as the interval which separates the deist from the atheist, and which cannot possibly constitute a *distinction of principle* in the adhesion which the mind gives to one or other of these degrees. We do not confound Protestants,” says M. Nicolas, “with deists”—neither, we add, do we confound Protestant with Protestant—“any more than M. Guizot confounds deists with atheists; but we confound them *as much*, because the determining principle of these different opinions is, with all of them, private judgment.”

And it is nothing to the purpose to urge, that the Anglican

professes an extreme objection to private judgment, as used by Dissenters and low Churchmen, and a great reverence for the principle of authority as upheld in the Church, so long as he necessarily uses his own private judgment in the selection of the doctrines which compose his creed; and while holding a certain *opinion* concerning authority, and the desirableness of submission to it, he is still in fact an authority to himself as much as any other Protestant is, neither more nor less: how should it be otherwise?\*

M. Nicolas makes some very good remarks upon the impossibility of any transaction or compromise between the principle of religious authority and moral liberty. M. Guizot cannot forget his old trade, nor get a constitutional government out of his head. In this respect he reminds us of Mr. Gladstone in our own country, whose last essay on ecclesiastical matters is built entirely, as we pointed out at the time, on parliamentary ideas, and expressed in parliamentary language. Hence M. Guizot, while very sincerely anxious to retain, or rather regain, the principle of authority in religious matters, as the only safeguard against social anarchy and ruin,—that abyss on the edge of which he perceives society to be tottering,—is still solicitous to secure what he conceives to be the moral liberty of man; and his notions of religious authority being altogether human, and his conception of moral liberty erroneous, he is pre-occupied with the notion of the necessity of placing checks on the governing power, of dividing and portioning out to authority and liberty their respective provinces and action, and guaranteeing the rights of each. Now, as our author very justly asks, who is to regulate these checks, and to appoint and maintain these bounds?

“Evidently it can be neither the one party nor the other, since they are the very parties interested. A third must intervene in order to establish harmony between them; and that third must be man himself.

“In the social order, says M. Guizot, it belongs to the political power to resolve the relations between authority and liberty. That is

\* It must be remembered that what is here asserted is meant to apply to the impossibility of laying down any basis for a creed outside the Catholic Church other than the shifting sand of private judgment. Submission to authority is, moreover, an act of the mind incompatible with a simultaneous protest against that very authority, which is the attitude, and constitutes the very essence, of Protestantism. But nothing is meant to be advanced implying a denial of that hope and persuasion cherished by every Catholic heart that the Protestant sects contain many implicit children of holy Church, or in any way contradictory of the conviction equally entertained, that many, though still entangled in error and manifold inconsistencies, are sincerely co-operating with God's grace, which is gradually leading them towards the truth. Inconsistency is in fact very often a good sign, though it belongs to an imperfect state. It is a sign of the heart being better than the head.



true. . . . But in the supernatural order, who shall determine these relations? Do these relations change and depend upon circumstances, as in the social state? . . . Are they not immutable? What, in fact, are they?"

To all these questions M. Guizot furnishes no reply; and we are left to suppose that he considers authority and liberty in the divine order as completely parallel with authority and liberty in the human. No doubt can be entertained upon this point by any one who impartially weighs M. Guizot's expressions, passing as he does from the social state to the divine order, and using similar language about each, and giving much kind advice, as he intends it, to the Church, as to accommodating her government to times and seasons, and the increased demands of the human mind for liberty of moral and intellectual action. He places the Church and civil government on a level; he desires that both should act with moderation and discretion; but amidst many professions of respect for the former—to which we do not, however, wish to deny a large measure of sincerity—he plainly considers that his advice is most needed in that quarter.

But let us hear our author on the subject of authority, to which he recurs again in the body of the work.

"Authority—and there exists but one alone, that of God, which has for its first title and foundation creation, and from which all others are derived and receive their commission—authority in its source is sovereign, absolute, and unlimited. To attempt to set bounds to it by any thing would be absurd, since this would contradict the very notion of a creating God; but for the lowest in the scale of creatures possessing reason to attempt to limit it, is a prodigy of folly and pride.

"What, then, you will ask me, is to become of liberty? Is it to be held of no account? Is it not of divine institution? However low in the scale of being you may place man, is he not made in the image of God? And is not the chief feature in this image liberty? I grant it. I go further still; I accuse you of not giving scope enough to liberty, in thus limiting it by authority; I would have it commensurate with that very authority, and infinite as God Himself. I will explain myself by giving a very simple definition of liberty.

"What is liberty? in what does it consist? Liberty consists in this:—*doing what we will, in doing what we ought.*

"I say *in doing what we ought*, because our duty, and that which we desire, do in reality coincide. Every man in fact, even when he does what is evil, desires, and desires only, what is good. The good, the true, the beautiful, in one word, God, under all His different aspects, such is the end of our nature; and as every being naturally desires the end for which it was created, man's liberty consists in the accomplishment of this end, in the development of his faculties according to this end; and hence in the satisfaction of his *true will*.

“ And so every man would go straight on at once to the true and the good, like an arrow to the goal, if he were not the slave of evil; if he swerve from it, it is only because his liberty meets with an obstacle against which it is too often bent and broken. Hence that saying of Ovid, so profoundly true—

. . . . .  
‘ Video meliora proboque,  
Deteriora sequor.’

And that of St. Paul: ‘ Non enim quod volo bonum hoc ago: sed quod odi malum illud facio.’ Who shall remove this obstacle to the accomplishment of good, that object of the will of man, and consequently of his liberty? Who shall give us the power of good? Authority.

“ Thus, for the child, it is the authority of his parents which interposes to remove those physical or moral obstacles which stand in the way of the development of his nature, and against which his will would be shattered every moment;—for the young man, it is the authority of a master, who on all subjects intervenes to remove the obstacle of ignorance, and open to his mind a free course for its development and exercise,—for man in his social capacity, it is civil authority which guarantees to him the free exercise of his rights;—and finally, for the natural man, it is the authority of God, of His grace and of His teaching, which frees us from the slavery of error and of the passions, and restores to us the liberty of good. In a word, liberty consisting, not alone in the barren *right*, but in the *power* of exercising and developing our faculties, it presupposes and implies authority, which confers this power in exchange for our submission. Thus liberty, far from being its rival, is in all things the daughter of authority. It finds in it the principle of its enfranchisement and the condition of its exercise.

“ Authority is essentially *liberatrix*. Hence the great name of *liberator* given to Jesus Christ. Hence that cry of liberty which resounds in each page of the Gospel, and which from the Gospel spreading into the world has laid therein the foundations of true liberty, moral liberty, the liberty of the children of God, the parent of all other liberties. ‘ If ye abide in my word,’ said our Divine Liberator to the Jews, ‘ you shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free.’ ”

M. Nicolas proceeds to shew that free-will is in no way impaired by this doctrine. Free-will is simply the *power* of choosing between good and evil, which power is increased by that submission to God which sets free the will from the tyranny of the passions. A capacity for evil, and a facility to be led into it, form no part of moral liberty; on the contrary, it is a hindrance and an obstruction to its exercise, inasmuch as it leads us away from the good which would necessarily be the object of our free choice. God possesses no such capacity



for evil. He cannot commit evil by the necessity of His nature. But is He therefore not free? Nay,

“it is in this that He is pre-eminently free. He has the sovereign power to do that which alone He wills. Made to His image, and called to a conformity therewith, we naturally desire what is good; but we have not always the *power* to effect what is good, nor consequently the freedom of our will; ignorance and passion deprive us of it. God, then, to restore us our freedom, and render it like to His own, communicates to us of His power and authority; and this communication is made by means of our submission to this authority.”

We have here the answer to all who, like M. Guizot, think they have discovered a safe *via media* between the license of Protestantism and the slavery, as they esteem it, of Popery. It is a favourite idea with members of the Establishment that Anglicanism has hit off this happy medium. They will urge frequently that we treat the matter too broadly as respects them, and that their theory is never so much as considered; that all those arguments concerning authority and private judgment, by which they confess we may demolish the Dissenters, fall harmless upon them. “You talk,” say they, “as if there were no other alternative but despotism, or the absence of all authority;” and they will proceed, perhaps, (for Anglicanism is pre-eminently national in the exclusive sense of the word,) to exemplify it from the constitutional government of “this favoured country.” “Popery,” they will say, “may be compared to absolute monarchy. Protestantism to democracy; but between these there is a constitutional government, where authority and liberty are duly balanced, and have each their allotted sphere and action. Such is the idea on which the Anglican Church is based;” and we may confidently add, that it is a false idea, an idea transferred from human things to divine, where it has, and can have, no place. Authority in divine things is no authority at all, if it be not supreme; it drops from the supernatural into the natural order, and becomes the mere instrument of a state machine, or of a system of moral police. That which checks, or can check authority, is in truth the supreme authority; now those checks must be human, and therefore the authority itself human; and this is in fact the truth of the matter. In separating from the Church, Protestants severed themselves from the divine depository of authority on earth. They desired to retain the supernatural order; but they no longer possessed a supernatural administrator of that order. Hence their jealousy of spiritual authority, which they confound with tyranny and despotism; and so, in truth, it would be, were it any thing else than the infallible authority of Christ Himself upon earth ruling still in His

Church. Knowing and feeling, however, that they do not possess this among themselves, and having lost the very idea of the possibility of any power on earth teaching and ruling with Christ's infallible authority; what wonder that they have either cast off all authority whatever, or, like the Protestant Establishment of this country, have, while keeping up a respectable semblance of it, surrounded that which is itself human with human checks and restrictions? The very idea of such a government is, we need scarcely add, incompatible with the notion of divine authority, which to be divine must be sovereign, infallible, and therefore without appeal, and without control.\*

Our author next goes on to speak of the consequences of the rejection of this divine and infallible authority.

"What, then, has Protestantism done by shaking off the yoke of the Church? What has philosophy done by shaking off the yoke of revelation? What have they both done by shaking off the yoke of authority? They have so far enslaved humanity to the yoke of error and disorder, to the yoke of the passions now become dominant, and whose fury, no longer restrained by the influence of faith, has brought the world to the state in which we now behold it. They have transferred it from submission, falsely called slavery, to real slavery, falsely called liberty. The world has become a great arena where slaves fight with each other for their gilded or rusty chains. May divine authority, Catholic authority, the only and true moral authority, intervene and be listened to in time to prevent final destruction, and bring back peace and true liberty, along with submission and unity!

"Protestantism is the first and great cause of this dreadful situation, because it first laid down the fatal principle of free inquiry, which, detaching man from the certain knowledge of his duty and from his attraction to the bosom of the Church, has given him up to his own ignorance, his own variations, his own appetites, and by the rapid descent of Deism and Rationalism has brought him down to Socialism and Communism, that is, to dissolution and chaos. How is it possible, then, that it could assist in bringing him out of this state?"

The third point which our author undertook to establish was, it will be remembered, the utter futility of any such co-operation as M. Guizot proposed between Catholics and Pro-

\* It is owing to the erroneous notion entertained by Protestants of moral liberty, which proceeds, as has been shewn, from their loss of an infallible teacher and ruler—in short, of a supernatural authority to interpret and enforce the supernatural order—that we find them always considering religious toleration (theoretically we mean, for practically they are no lovers of it) as a good *per se*; they consider that it is a boon conferred on the human mind to have the liberty to think as it pleases on religious matters, that is, to take up with error, if it prefer it to truth.



testants, as well as the falseness of the principle on which the proposed union would be based. According to M. Guizot, the faith common to all Christian denominations is, "belief in a divine revelation and in Jesus Christ come down on earth to save us; the common interest, faith and the law of Christ, to be defended against impiety and anarchy; which faith and common interest being," says M. Guizot, "infinitely above all the points of difference which separate them, ought therefore, in spite of these differences, to unite them against the common enemy."

These words are specious, but they are mere words; and their emptiness is well unmasked by the able writer who has undertaken to refute them. There is, in fact, no common faith between Catholics and Protestants; but this assertion must not be confounded with another, that this or that individual Protestant believes nothing in common with Catholics; for this, of course, is manifestly untrue. Christ in His Church teaching us by His infallible word, and thus communicating Himself to our intellect as the True Light, the Eternal Truth, the proper food of the reasonable intelligence, and Christ on our altars feeding us with His precious body in the blessed sacrament of the Eucharist, and thus nourishing our whole heart and soul with that true life which is infinite love—God Himself, who is love,—Christ, in short, abiding with us for ever as the truth and the life, as light and love: behold the sum and substance of the Catholic's faith,—and behold at the same time precisely what Protestantism rejects. Neither is there one single word in M. Guizot's statement of the common faith of Christians upon the meaning of which Protestants themselves can agree. Jesus Christ, His nature, His person, His office; are they agreed upon these? are they agreed upon the sense in which He is said to save us? or upon the terms of that salvation? or finally, are they agreed as to the very word 'faith'? Does faith in Christ, or faith in a divine revelation, bear the same meaning in the mouth of every Protestant? We know well enough what these words mean in that of a Catholic; but who shall fix what is their precise Protestant signification? Impossible; since it varies with each sect, not to say each individual. Union is therefore impossible where there is no common ground. Is it even desirable? Undoubtedly, as M. Nicolas very justly observes, we are bound, as fellow-men, as fellow-citizens, as sociable, moral, and religious beings, to unite "against the common enemy of all society and civilisation;" we are bound also to rejoice in, to honour and encourage every effort made to defend Christianity, whether it be by Catholic or Protestant;

but this is not the question: it is a coalition which is proposed, in which mutual differences shall be waived by common consent, as being of far minor importance than the interests at stake, and much less in amount than the truth held in common. The latter assertion may be said to be disposed of by the foregoing remarks. The difference between Catholics and Protestants is a radical difference, and therefore affects every doctrine of faith, and the principle of faith itself; while the fundamental principle of Protestantism is that very same evil principle which lies at the root of the mischief which we are called upon to unite to combat. It has been the fruitful parent of Scepticism, Naturalism, and Pantheism in the religious order, and of Socialism and Communism in the social order. M. Nicolas concludes (and we fully agree with him), "that for us Catholics the common danger of Socialism is not so great as the particular danger of Protestantism," inasmuch as the principle is more to be dreaded than its consequences. "By the continued profession of these principles Protestantism authorises and virtually nourishes these disastrous consequences, which without that support would stand unconnected with any thing human."

There is a sense also in which Socialism and Communism cannot be said to threaten us with a common danger. The logical development and legitimate offspring of Protestantism, they must drag their parent along with them into the abyss; but it is their material consequences which alone threaten *us*. "Feeling itself near its end, Protestantism would now lay hold on Catholicism under colour of a common interest. . . . The interest, however, is not a common one; for Protestantism is condemned, and Catholicism is justified, by Socialism." Truth will shine the more brilliantly when the excesses to which error leads have been made palpable to all. If Protestants would provide for their own safety, they must indeed lay hold of that "fraternal hand which has been extended to them for three centuries;" not, however, to draw us to take part with them, but to return themselves "to unity, and to the bosom of our common Mother."

We cannot do better than conclude with a few extracts from our author on the subject of toleration; for M. Guizot appeals in the name of charity, as well as prudence, in favour of the combination he desires. By charity he understands, of course, religious toleration; not merely civil toleration, but dogmatic toleration—a very different thing. Circumstances may render the former highly desirable,—and such circumstances very generally exist at the present day; but the latter can never be admissible by a Catholic,—and charity, so far



from authorising it, is utterly opposed to it; for charity can never be separated from truth.

"If the highest of all goods is truth, the highest charity is the charity of truth; the first of all duties is not to accept, not to tolerate error, never to cease from combating it as the mortal enemy, not only of the truth to which we are all bound, but of the charity in virtue of which we are bound to communicate it to our brethren. . . . We must tend to union, but, to union by unity which is its life, and not by scepticism, which is its death. Civil toleration itself protests against a dogmatic toleration which should lead to such a result; and here I would call attention to an important consideration.

"It is a serious error, and one, unfortunately, very prevalent, to believe that religious liberty is granted to us for any other purpose but that we may practise religion itself, and practise it well; and that we are free, if we choose, to turn it into a liberty to be irreligious, or even indifferent. The law that confers religious liberty has been called an atheistical law: this would be a great mistake, and an unmerited reproach. On the contrary, such a law, in its true essence, is eminently religious. Liberty of conscience is granted only in order to allow of a more spontaneous and lively movement of the conscience of man towards its author, and not in order to permit him to counteract that movement, or simply to refuse his consent to it. No doubt it is a matter between our consciences and God; but it is no less a matter of conscience between us and society. If the latter makes no inquiry into the use to which we turn the religious liberty which it grants us, it is because such an inquiry would be an interference with liberty; but it is not less a violation of that liberty to turn it against its object, or even to leave it idle. It is to abuse the trust reposed in us; it is to cheat the intentions of society; since it is impossible that society can be so indifferent to the use we make of our liberty as to admit that we may turn it into a liberty to be irreligious and impious, and to become a nation of sceptics and atheists. . . . The lowest earthly interests are opposed to this, since a nation of sceptics and atheists would soon become a nation of savages and ruffians. Impiety or religious indifference is no part of that social right implied in religious liberty; it is an abuse of that right, it is a violation of duty; it is the act of a bad citizen. Such, perhaps, were not the private sentiments of those who drew up the law of liberty of conscience; but I maintain that the principles from which they deduced it were identical with those to which we appeal, and as legislators they can have had no other. As for us, it is only in this spirit that we can accept that religious liberty which we deem a blessing, not as facilitating scepticism and indifference, but as imposing a greater religious obligation, and as a means of leading men back by the path of liberty to that same faith which was formerly maintained by intolerance."

In the spirit of this passage we heartily concur. Nothing can be more painful than to hear Catholics, as we sometimes

do, vindicating the cause of religious liberty on Protestant and infidel grounds. We believe, however, that this proceeds, in the majority of cases, simply from want of reflection, and because the true grounds on which such liberty can be claimed have never occurred to them, or been properly presented to their minds. When these grounds shall be well understood, it will be perceived that Catholics in the nineteenth century may support the cause of religious liberty without condemning Catholics of the twelfth or thirteenth for an opposite course; nay, they may uphold it upon principles essentially the same. We cannot say that we fully enter into our author's distinction between the abstract intentions and wishes of society and the actual sentiments which animated, and the motives which guided, those governments which granted religious liberty; neither do we see that legislators have generally appealed to the high principle he lays down. It appears to us, that, as respects Protestant governments, religious toleration has been extended, so far as it *has* been extended, to Catholics solely from the pressure of circumstances, and because they could not help it; while the general principles put forward by them to justify religious liberty certainly strike us as highly atheistical, being grounded upon two errors,—the one, that absolute truth does not practically exist for man, since it has not pleased God to furnish any infallible means of arriving at it, *ergo* religion is a matter between God and the conscience alone; and secondly, that the object of religion is not the knowledge of God and His truth, but a moral life, such as is useful to our neighbours and to our country, *ergo* doctrines are of no importance in themselves, and the morality of the Gospel, conceived as separable from its dogmas, is alone of any real consequence. Where Catholic rulers have been animated by a Protestant spirit, they have been guided so far by the same ungodly maxims; where it has been otherwise, toleration has been extended to Protestants, wherever their peaceable demeanour has rendered it possible, and it has not been inconsistent with the well-being of the Church herself.

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#### LEGENDS OF THE MADONNA.

*Legends of the Madonna, as represented in the Fine Arts.* By Mrs. Jameson. London: Longmans, 1852.

To a Catholic reader this volume is certainly not so interesting as its predecessors. We rise from a perusal of it with keener



feelings of disappointment than from either of the former volumes of the same series. Of course this is easily to be accounted for, when once we consider the subject and the author. It was impossible that a Protestant should write on the histories or legends even of any of the saints, much less of the Queen of Saints, in a way that should be thoroughly satisfactory to a Catholic; it was no less impossible that a person well informed, endowed with talents and good taste, and capable of appreciating the beautiful both in poetry and in art, such as Mrs. Jameson is, should write on such matters what it would not be interesting to read. But in proportion to the sacredness of the subject, and the devotion with which Catholics are in the habit of regarding it, our sensibilities are awakened, and we are more painfully alive to any shortcomings, or, if it be so, positive faults, in the mode of handling it. This is strikingly the case with the volume before us. We cannot deny but that many beautiful legends are told in a very pleasing way; but they are for the most part legends so intimately interwoven with the very texture of our faith, that none but the most delicate hand, guided by the instinct of a most devout and dutiful heart, could possibly treat of them in the way in which Mrs. Jameson professes to do, namely, only according to "their poetic and artistic capabilities," without giving us very real pain. We are satisfied that she really means what she says, when she assures us in her preface,

"Not for worlds would I be guilty of a scoffing allusion to any belief or any object held sacred by sincere and earnest hearts; but neither has it been possible for me to write in a tone of acquiescence, where I altogether differ in feeling and opinion. On this point I shall need, and feel sure that I shall obtain, the generous construction of readers of all persuasions."

In other words, Mrs. Jameson does not wish to *offend* her Catholic readers; and certainly we have found nothing from the beginning to the end of this volume at which a Catholic reader could reasonably "take offence," as it is called, or would feel any temptation to do so (excepting once indeed; "The Virgin Mary as an idol"). On the other hand, we have found a great deal by which they will be *pained*; so that, whilst giving her credit for the very best intentions, we cannot altogether congratulate her on her success.

It was necessary to make these remarks, if we would deal justly by our readers, and give them a fair idea of a book whose title cannot fail to be very attractive to them. At the same time we are well aware that we are trying the book by a standard for which it was never intended. Mrs. J. does not profess to write a book of theology or of devotion, but a book

“merely artistic,” “to lead the lover of art, wandering through a church or gallery, to new sources of pleasure;” and in this point of view she has been eminently successful. She has supplied what all Protestant lovers of the fine arts must long have felt the want of, a key to the meaning of the pictures which they admire. Indeed it has often been a subject of curious speculation to us, as we have watched groups of our fellow-countrymen gazing on the treasures of various picture-galleries on the continent, what possible meaning they could attach to the great majority of the paintings which they find there. As long as the scene represented is some event taken from the Holy Scriptures, they might understand and appreciate it; but all other pictures, representing events in the lives of the saints, could be little better than an unknown tongue to them. With Catholics, of course, it is very different; the study of the lives of the saints has been a part of their education; yet even they too will probably find in Mrs. Jameson’s pages many a legend, or still more frequently a various reading of a legend, with which they were not familiar. Indeed it is worth observing, that Mrs. J. has not always adopted the most common and approved form of the legend; and her readers should be on their guard, therefore, against receiving it as such. This is one of the inconveniences incidental to the writing of such a book by any but a Catholic. As one often hears poor ignorant people very confident about the truth of some story because they have seen it “in print,” so Protestants, who in these matters are as ignorant as the most uneducated, think that they can speak confidently about some matter of Catholic doctrine and Catholic practice, because they have read it in “a Catholic book.” It never seems to occur to them that there may be *bad* Catholic books; we do not mean morally bad, but intellectually bad; written by persons deficient in judgment or in information, and so, as authorities, utterly worthless; and we are sorry to see that Mrs. Jameson has been occasionally misled by authorities of this kind. See, for instance, her account of our Lord’s appearance to His blessed Mother after His resurrection (in p. 322), where she attributes to the angels who are supposed to have accompanied and preceded Him the Easter hymn, *Regina cœli lætare*; a hymn whose history is known, and which belongs to a much later age. We are almost inclined to doubt whether *any* authority could be found for introducing this feature into this particular legend; and there are other instances too in which we should have been glad to have been referred to the authority from whence it is derived, not only in a general way, but quite accurately, “chapter and verse,” as the saying is. Of course, for Mrs. J.’s purpose, this was by no means necessary,



but it would have been more satisfactory to a numerous class of her readers ; and we hope, in a second edition, she may be induced to supply the deficiency.

The introduction to this book, though forming materially but a small proportion of the whole, is in other respects perhaps its most important portion ; certainly it furnishes abundant matter, not for the mere passing comments of the reviewer, but rather for half a dozen volumes on Christian antiquities, ecclesiastical history, and dogmatic theology. In truth, Mrs. Jameson has here waded into waters far beyond her depth ; and her best friends will, we are sure, agree with us in thinking that she would have done wisely not to venture into them at all. She may be very well informed, have a very correct taste, and be altogether a most unexceptionable authority on matters of art ; but of the other and higher studies which we have mentioned she knows nothing, or, if any thing, it is only that little learning which is so proverbially dangerous. We are far from being disposed to be hypercritical, and would not go out of our way to point out trifling theological inaccuracies occurring in a clever work on an independent subject by a Protestant lady ; but there are passages in the present volume, more especially in the Introduction, which cannot be passed over in silence. What will our readers think, for instance, of a person undertaking to give us the history of the Nestorian heresy and the council of Ephesus, and starting with the assumption that the Catholic party were the Monophysites (p. xxii) ? or, again, the history of the controversy about the Immaculate Conception down to the present day, and telling us that "one of the latest, *if not the last* writer on the subject was Cardinal Lambruschini" (p. 49) ? and yet once more, that "the legends of the death, the assumption, and the coronation of the Virgin" were imported into the West by means of "the pilgrimages to the Holy Land and the Crusaders in the eleventh and twelfth centuries" (p. xxv) ; as though the legend of the Assumption, for example, were not to be found in the Sacramentarium of St. Gregory the Great, as also in the old Gothic and Gallican missals published by Cardinal Thomassi, and belonging to the eighth and ninth centuries. And whilst speaking of the Assumption, by the bye, what *does* Mrs. Jameson mean by her interpretation of this title in p. 342 ? We give it in her own words and italics : "She is here *Maria Virgo Assumpta*, or in Italian *l'Assunta* ; she has *assumed*, or taken upon her, the glory of immortality, though not yet crowned." Mrs. J. knows the true meaning of the title, and gives it elsewhere ; how came she to fall at once into bad grammar and bad theology in this place ?

We will fill the small remainder of our space with a speci-

men of the style in which the legends are told. We will take the very first that occurs, as being probably less familiar to our readers than any which we could select from the life of our Blessed Lady herself.

THE LEGEND OF JOACHIM AND ANNA.

“There was a man of Nazareth, whose name was Joachim, and he had for his wife a woman of Bethlehem, whose name was Anna, and both were of the royal race of David. Their lives were pure and righteous, and they served the Lord with singleness of heart. And being rich, they divided their substance into three portions,—one for the service of the temple, one for the poor and the strangers, and the third for their household. On a certain feast-day, Joachim brought double offerings to the Lord according to his custom; for he said, ‘Out of my superfluity will I give for the whole people, that I may find favour in the sight of the Lord, and forgiveness for my sins.’ And when the children of Israel brought their gifts, Joachim also brought his; but the high priest Issachar stood over against and opposed him, saying, ‘It is not lawful for thee to bring thine offering, seeing thou hast not begot issue in Israel.’ And Joachim was exceeding sorrowful, and went down to his house; and he searched through all the registers of the twelve tribes to discover if he alone had been childless in Israel. And he found that all the righteous men, and the patriarchs who had lived before him, had been the fathers of sons and daughters. And he called to mind his father Abraham, to whom in his old age had been granted a son, even Isaac. And Joachim was more and more sorrowful; and he would not be seen by his wife, but avoided her, and went away into the pastures where were the shepherds and the sheepcotes. And he built himself a hut, and fasted forty days and forty nights; for he said, ‘Until the Lord God look upon me mercifully, prayer shall be my meat and drink.’ But his wife Anna remained lonely in the house, and mourned with a twofold sorrow for her widowhood and for her barrenness. Then drew near the last day of the feast of the Lord; and Judith her handmaid said to Anna, ‘How long wilt thou thus afflict thy soul? Behold the feast of the Lord is come, and it is not lawful for thee thus to mourn. Take this silken fillet, which was bestowed on me by one of high degree whom I formerly served, and bind it round thy head; for it is not fit that I who am thy handmaid should wear it; but it is fitting for thee, whose brow is as the brow of a crowned queen.’ And Anna replied, ‘Begone! such things are not for me, for the Lord hath humbled me. As for this fillet, some wicked person hath given it to thee; and art thou come to make me a partaker in thy sin?’ And Judith her maid answered, ‘What evil shall I wish thee, since thou wilt not hearken to my voice? for worse I cannot wish thee than that with which the Lord hath afflicted thee, seeing that he hath shut up thy womb, that thou shouldst not be a mother in Israel.’ And Anna hearing these words was sorely troubled. And she laid aside her mourning garments, and she adorned



her head, and put on her bridal attire ; and at the ninth hour she went forth into her garden, and sat down under a laurel-tree, and prayed earnestly. And looking up to heaven she saw within the laurel-bush a sparrow's nest ; and mourning within herself, she said, 'Alas, and woe is me ! who hath begotten me ? who hath begotten me ? who hath brought me forth ? that I should be accursed in the sight of Israel, and scorned and shamed before my people, and cast out of the temple of the Lord. Woe is me ! to what shall I be likened ? I cannot be likened to the fowls of heaven, for the fowls of heaven are fruitful in thy sight, O Lord ! Woe is me ! to what shall I be likened ? Not to the unreasoning beasts of the earth, for they are fruitful in thy sight, O Lord ! Woe is me ! to what shall I be likened ? Not to these waters, for they are fruitful in thy sight, O Lord ! Woe is me ! to what shall I be likened ? Not unto the earth, for the earth bringeth forth her fruit in due season, and praiseth thee, O Lord !' And behold an Angel of the Lord stood by her and said, 'Anna, thy prayer is heard ; thou shalt bring forth, and thy child shall be blessed throughout the whole world.' And Anna said, 'As the Lord liveth, whatever I shall bring forth, be it a man child or a maid, I will present it an offering to the Lord.' And behold another Angel came and said to her, 'See, thy husband Joachim is coming with his shepherds ;' for an Angel had spoken to him also, and comforted him with promises. And Anna went forth to meet her husband, and Joachim came from the pasture with his herds, and they met at the golden-gate ; and Anna ran and embraced her husband, and hung upon his neck, saying, 'Now know I that the Lord hath blessed me. I who was a widow am no longer a widow. I who was barren shall become a joyful mother.' And they returned home together. And when her time was come, Anna brought forth a daughter ; and she said, 'This day my soul magnifieth the Lord.' And she laid herself down in her bed ; and she called the name of her child Mary, which in the Hebrew is Miriam."

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#### A FEW MORE WORDS ON LA SALETTE.

*Un nouveau Sanctuaire à Marie ; ou Conclusion de l'Affaire de la Salette.* Par l'Abbé Rousselot. Grenoble, 1853.

FATHER NEWMAN, in one of his admirable Lectures on Catholicism in England, mentions it as one of the characteristics of "the Prejudiced Man," that he obstinately refuses to put himself in the way of gaining correct and trustworthy information on the subject with reference to which he is prejudiced. Many of our readers must have indulged in a hearty laugh over the following most true and graphic sketch :—"If a person ventures to ask the prejudiced man what he knows of Catholics personally ; what he knows of individuals, of their ways, of

their books, or of their worship, he blesses himself that he knows nothing of them at all, and he never will; nay, if they fall in his way, he will take himself out of it; and if unawares he shall ever be pleased with a Catholic without knowing who it is, he wishes by anticipation to retract such satisfaction." Such one-sidedness and wilful perverseness seems at first sight almost incredible; and yet daily experience shews us that the picture is in no way overdrawn; it is literally a true and faithful account of what we see on every side of us in the conduct of a large section of Protestants with reference to their Catholic neighbours. But we are afraid that even amongst ourselves it would not be at all impossible to find an illustration of the same spirit and temper of mind; exercised not indeed with reference to *persons*, for this would be a breach of charity from which every Catholic would shrink with horror, but with reference to certain *subjects*, the injury that is thereby done to the cause of *truth* not being so much considered, and therefore not so carefully guarded against.

The work whose title stands at the head of this article will at once suggest to our readers one at least of the subjects to which we allude,—the subject of modern miracles. It is notorious that there are not a few English Catholics who cannot bear to hear this subject brought forward and insisted on in any shape, excepting only in the most general form possible. They may be prepared, for instance, to subscribe to the following proposition as safe and true, viz. that modern miracles are possible; or, in other words, that Almighty God has nowhere debarred Himself by any express declaration or promise from interfering with the ordinary course of events and the laws of nature in the nineteenth century, any more than He had in the first, or the third, or the ninth; but if a man ventures to go further than this, and to insist upon some one modern miracle in particular (such as M. Ratisbonne's conversion in Rome, the picture of the Madonna at Rimini, the apparition on the mountain of La Salette, or any other), and to say that it is true, and has been established by satisfactory evidence,—they shake their heads, and do not like to hear it spoken of. Sometimes their argument assumes a tone of apparent candour; and whilst acknowledging that the history may perhaps be true, they only deprecate its being talked or written about, on the ground that it is of no essential importance; that even though its truth could be demonstrated, yet religion has nothing to gain by its circulation, since that has long since been abundantly established by the miracles of Holy Scripture, to say nothing of many well-authenticated ones recorded in ecclesiastical history. We cannot, of course,



deny the truth of one at least of the premises of this specious argument; no one is foolish enough to imagine that the Christian religion in any way depends upon the truth or falsehood of any miracle, or any number of miracles, not recorded in Holy Writ; nevertheless, the conclusion which it is proposed to draw from this acknowledgment is altogether irrelevant. Will any man in his senses pretend that religion, and the defenders of religion, have no occasion to concern themselves with any thing that does not affect its very foundations? Can it be said with truth that religion has no interest in a history like that of La Salette, for example, where, in consequence of the alleged miracle, the Holy Sacrifice has been offered during the past year well-nigh a thousand times, and where from ten to twelve thousand persons have during the same period partaken of the bread of life? Surely not. Every one must see at once, that if God vouchsafes to work a miracle, it cannot be right or safe for men to "pass by on the other side," and to treat it as though it were a matter of complete indifference whether it had happened or not.

More commonly, however, the persons of whom we speak adopt a different line of argument; they feel that it is scarcely safe to acknowledge the possible truth of the history, and yet to profess indifference about its being known; they prefer, therefore, to take shelter behind the alleged insufficiency of the evidence. And where this insufficiency is really felt, and the conviction of it is the result, not of a stubborn refusal to study the evidence, but of an honest and diligent examination of it, there remains nothing more to be said. We may dissent from the conclusion that has been arrived at, and point out errors, if we can find them, in the intellectual process by which it was reached; but we have no right to insinuate or suspect any thing against the moral or religious qualifications of the dissatisfied inquirer. It happens, however, in a number of these cases—and we believe we might safely say in the great majority of them—that the insufficiency of the evidence is most loudly complained of by those who have studied it least. M. Rousselot tells an amusing story in the volume before us illustrative of this fact; and we could supply a tolerably close parallel or two from our own experience, with reference to this same history of La Salette. The history has excited a great deal of discussion and opposition in France, not only on the part of Protestants, as in this country, but also from a few Catholics, including about thirty out of the 820 priests to be found in the diocese. One of these Catholics, meeting M. Rousselot one day after the publication of his two first volumes on the subject, expressed his dis-

belief of the whole narrative. "Very well," answered the Abbé; "of course you are quite at liberty to discredit it; but, at any rate, you have taken care to arm yourself with good reasons for coming to such a conclusion?" "Oh, certainly," was the ready reply. "May I beg the favour of hearing some of them?" "Well, the first is, that you have inserted in your books some facts as miracles which have since been proved not to be such; and this discovery makes one misdoubt the truth of all the rest." "Be good enough to name an instance." "That history of the girl at Gap, and that other at Annecy." *Neither of which had even been so much as alluded to in M. Rousselot's books.* And in like manner we ourselves have been obliged before now to bring to an abrupt conclusion some discussion in which we have been engaged, even with Catholics, upon the credibility of the history of La Salette, by discovering that our opponent had never read an accredited account of the vision. They had picked up objections against it from the *Times* newspaper, and other equally respectable and veracious authorities; but as for reading the original narrative, "they had no wish to do that; they had seen and read quite enough already." Were we not justified, then, in claiming a share for ourselves in the description of "the prejudiced man," as given by Father Newman? Are there not some amongst us, to whom we might truly say:

"Mutato nomine, de te  
Fabula narratur?"

We have returned, however, to the subject of La Salette, not so much for the sake of recommending it again to those who profess to discredit or not to care about it, but rather for the opportunity which M. Rousselot's new volume affords us of supplying one or two important omissions in our former articles. The present volume of the Abbé Rousselot may almost be said to be the history of the opposition that has been raised against the children's narrative from the day it was first told, down to the present hour; and, as always happens in such cases, the cavils and objections of opponents only serve to place the truth in a still more striking light. Most of the objections that have been made are to be found in Mr. Northcote's pamphlet, followed by their respective answers. But there is one, and in many respects the most important of all, of which he has not made any mention; and since we have seen it quoted in some of the Protestant journals in this country, and it appears to have been adopted in France as *the* one chief objection which is to override every other, it will be worth while to give some account of it.



It is pretended, then, that the boy Maximin has acknowledged the whole story to be an imposture, and that the truth of this confession cannot possibly be called in question, for it was made to the venerable curate of Ars. Probably there are but few among our readers who know who this curate of Ars is, or why this circumstance should be insisted on as adding any special value to the confession. On a future occasion we may probably enter on some interesting particulars respecting this person; for the present it will be sufficient to say that he enjoys very considerable, we might almost say universal, reputation in the south of France, for his holiness of life, and for many spiritual gifts with which he is believed to be endowed. Amongst these gifts is "the discerning of spirits;" and many wonderful stories are told of the way in which this gift has been exercised to the confusion of gainsayers, and the edification of the faithful. The Abbé Rousselot in the volume before us speaks of him as "*regardé à juste titre comme un saint à miracles.*" It is not a little amusing therefore to observe the infidel and Protestant journals, both of this country and of France, proclaiming the praises of the Catholic saint, in order to give additional weight to the story of Maximin's confession, which they would fain indorse with so venerable a name. It is only another striking example of the want of good faith which is so constantly the characteristic of Protestant controversy. The real circumstances of the case are these. On the 19th of September, 1850, the fourth anniversary of the apparition, the boy Maximin was one of the thousands of pilgrims who visited the mountain. It was known that he was to be there; and two parties in particular were awaiting his arrival with very special anxiety, one for a political, the other for a religious purpose, or at least what was supposed to be such. Those who remember the history of the imaginary visions of Martin, the peasant of Gallardon, some twenty years since, will not be surprised to hear that an attempt has been made from the first moment to give a political aspect to the secret said to have been entrusted to the children by "the lady" at La Salette. It has been already mentioned that the government of Louis Philippe took cognisance of the facts of the case; and doubtless this was one of the causes that instigated them to make inquiries into the matter. There are many persons both in France and elsewhere, who believe that a certain Baron de Richemont, who resides, or lately resided, in Lyons, is the real Louis XVII., and is destined even yet to ascend the French throne. Some of this party persuaded themselves that the prophetic secret of "the lady" must needs concern the fortunes of their hero;

and they thought by presenting a portrait of him to the boy Maximin, and suggesting at the same time many artful questions, they might chance to elicit from the youth some corroboration of their hopes and fancies. For this purpose they proceeded to the mountain on the day in question, and diligently applied themselves, but in vain, to gain the desired information. The other party to which we have alluded appear to have been deceived by some visionary enthusiast, or by their own imaginations, into a belief that it was the will of God that Maximin should become a member of a particular religious congregation, well known and much respected in that part of the country. These two parties, having distinct objects in view, yet agreed in one thing, viz. that they wished to remove the children from La Salette and take them to Lyons; and in fact they succeeded in taking them as far as Grenoble at once. Here, however, Melanie obstinately refused to go any further, and by order of the Bishop she was placed with the religious with whom she has ever since remained. Maximin too was far from feeling easy in his conscience as to the journey he had undertaken; and by the advice of the Bishop he entered a charitable institution in the town, to await the opening of the little seminary into which he was promised admission, and where he has since resided. He had scarcely entered the house, however, before he was reclaimed by his companions of the previous day, on the plea that he was engaged to dine with them, and with a promise that he should be brought back again in an hour. Being allowed to go out with these gentlemen, he is next persuaded to accompany them to Lyons, whence they prosecute their journey the same evening to Ars. Early the next morning the boy is introduced to the curate, and remains with him for about a quarter of an hour. On coming out from the sacristy, he announces to his guides that he is advised to return to Grenoble, and put himself at the disposal of the Bishop. This was far from being the result which they had looked for, and they insist on his going back and consulting the curate again. He does so; but the result is still the same; whereupon they take him back to Lyons, and hand him over to the friends of the Baron de Richemont. As soon as he saw the baron, the boy began to laugh, recognising at once the original of the portrait that had been shewn him at La Salette; a lady who was present immediately proceeded to question him about his secret; to which Maximin promptly replied, that if they could only talk upon that subject, he should take his departure. And out of these two interviews, the one with the curate at Ars, the other with the Baron de Richemont at Lyons, has



been concocted the most wonderful story about the boy having acknowledged that the whole affair was an imposture, and then having been examined by the Cardinal Archbishop of Lyons, and very severely rebuked for his misconduct. Both assertions are utterly false. We do not indeed know the precise details of what passed at Ars; it seems tolerably certain that there was some degree of temporary misunderstanding between the curate and the boy, arising, as far as we can gather, partly from the indistinct utterance of the aged ecclesiastic, partly from the particular way in which he worded one of his questions. But what is beyond all dispute is this, that the curate himself believes in the reality of the vision as reported by the children, and recommends many of his penitents to make a pilgrimage to the sanctuary. These facts, attested by innumerable friends of the venerable curé, are abundantly established by the Abbé Rousselot in the volume now before us. We can afford to dismiss, therefore, as utterly futile, all objections urged against the history of La Salette on the authority of an imaginary confession of imposture made by the boy. Neither Maximin nor Melanie have ever prevaricated or wavered in the tale they originally told.

Another objection which we have sometimes heard, and which is sufficiently disposed of in this little volume, concerns the alleged imbecility of the Bishop of Grenoble. It has been whispered in certain quarters that an episcopal decision coming from so aged and infirm a prelate is not entitled to any real weight; and it is added, that the Apostolic See has given a very significant token of its assent to this same judgment, by depriving the said Bishop of all exercise of episcopal functions, and appointing another in his place. The *fact* is, that the Bishop petitioned to be relieved from a burden, the adequate discharge of which was rendered extremely difficult by reason of his bodily infirmities; Rome granted the petition, but requested the venerable Bishop to *recommend his own successor*, a tolerably clear proof that the Holy See, at least, does not consider him to be in his dotage.

A third point, on which M. Rousselot has furnished us with new and interesting particulars, concerns the decision of the children that they would reveal their secret to the Pope. It appears that towards the middle or end of March 1851, it was intimated to the Bishop of Grenoble by his Eminence the Cardinal Archbishop of Lyons, that his Holiness had expressed some desire to be informed of the secret. Two priests were immediately appointed to have an interview with the children, and to instruct them in the obligation of obedience they were under, if the Pope should see fit hereafter to issue

his commands upon this subject. M. Auvergne, the Bishop's secretary, was one of these, and M. Rousselot the other. Maximin seems to have had no difficulty or hesitation in the matter at all; at first he declined to give an answer to the hypothetical case proposed to him. "If the Pope were to ask you to tell him your secret, would you tell it?" he was asked. His reply was, "When the Pope has asked me, it will be time enough to think of this. I shall see when the time comes, according to what he says to me." "But if he should *command* you?" "Oh, then I should tell him." Melanie was more timid and doubtful; and it cost her two or three days of painful anxiety before she could resolve the same question in the affirmative; and her consent was given at last only with a very strict proviso that the communication was to be made either immediately to the Pope himself, or to be written in a letter which should be sealed and conveyed to him by some thoroughly trustworthy person. "Supposing the Pope," it was asked, "when he knows your secret, should publish it; would this distress you?" "No; for that would be entirely *his* affair; it would be no longer any concern of mine. But how would it be," continued Melanie, "*supposing the secret were something which concerned himself?*" "In that case," was the prudent answer, "he will of course use his own discretion as to publishing it or not."

Two other little details connected with this secret, and the manner of its communication to the Pope, are worth mentioning. Maximin being asked how he had begun his letter to the Pope, answered, "I began in this way: They say (*on dit*) that on the 19th of September, 1846, I saw the Blessed Virgin; one may judge of the truth or falsehood of this opinion by what follows." Melanie was asked whether any particular dates had been assigned to the calamities which were foretold, and she replied *in the affirmative*. This answer, taken in conjunction with her inquiry about the Pope addressed to the Abbé Rousselot, which has been already recorded, may justify a suspicion that the events foretold are at no considerable distance; certainly it seems to shew that the present generation may reasonably expect to see them come to pass; but even though this expectation should be realised, we do not doubt but that ingenious means will still be devised whereby the whole history may be brought into discredit, or at least made to appear as in no way superior to the order of things human and natural.



## SHORT NOTICES.

THE last month has brought an unusual supply of Catholic literature from America. Messrs. Dunigan, New York (London, Dolman), are bringing out in numbers a magnificent edition of *Haydock's Family Bible*. Of the contents of this work it is not necessary that we should say more than that the Notes and Commentaries are given without abridgment from the original edition; as a specimen of typography, it reflects the highest credit upon the publishers; and when completed it will form a really magnificent volume, supplied at a very reasonable price.

Messrs. Murphy and Co., Baltimore (London, Dolman), send us *The Spawife, or the Queen's Secret*, a tale (in two volumes) of the times of Queen Elizabeth. It will enable our readers to guess what the secret is, if we refer them to the last note at the end of Dr. Lingard's *Life of the "Virgin Queen;"* and when we add that the book is from the same pen as "*Shandy Maguire*," they will know that there can be no lack of interest either in the subject or in the mode of handling it. We have been much interested by reading it; but we are not sure that we think it quite so successful as its predecessor. It is of so much more ambitious a character; and its readers will feel that they are scarcely able to do it justice, from the fact that some of the *dramatis personæ* necessarily bring to mind recollections of the principal characters in other novels with which it is dangerous to provoke comparison; we allude especially to the *historical* portion of the *Waverley Novels*. The plot is cleverly conceived, and enables the author to draw a striking picture of the principal characteristics of the age in which it is laid.

From the same publishers we have two excellent compendiums of *history*, the one *ancient*, the other *modern*, from the pen of Dr. Fredet, Professor of History in St. Mary's College, Baltimore. We observe that this is the *fifth* edition of the *Ancient History*, and the *tenth* of the *Modern*. From their literary merit, however, we are not at all surprised to learn that they have been so well received, whilst for the soundness of their principles we sincerely rejoice that they should enjoy so extensive a circulation. Dr. Fredet seems to us to have achieved the difficult task of writing history briefly without making it dull. Most men who might undertake to give us the history of the world from the dispersion of the sons of Noe, after the building of Babel, down to the battle of Actium and the change of the Roman republic into an empire, and again from the Birth of Christ down to the year of our Lord 1850, in two volumes of 500 pages each, would have produced a mere dry chronicle of unconnected facts, most accurately true perhaps, yet at the same time most hopelessly uninteresting: Dr. Fredet's books, while written principally for the use of schools, will be found eminently readable by all persons.

*The Governess, or the Effects of Good Example* (Baltimore, Hedian and O'Brien; London, Dolman), is not so recent a publication as those we have hitherto mentioned; we believe, however, that we have not before recommended it, as we now desire to do, for lending-libraries, &c. It is one of the best American Catholic tales we have met with for a long time. It deserved to fall into the hands of a better printer or more careful corrector of the press. Its misprints are unfortunately innumerable.

*A Letter* has just appeared addressed to his late Parishioners, by Lord Charles Thynne, &c. (Bristol, Reader; London, Burns, and Dolman).

Lord C. T. was received into the Church some few months since; and, like so many other English clergymen under the same circumstances, he had fully determined, as he says, "on remaining perfectly silent" as to the important step he had taken; the Bishop of Salisbury, however, chose to speak publicly against him from his own pulpit; and this has caused him to change his determination, and to publish these few words of explanation to his former parishioners. The letter is very short, and characterised by extreme simplicity, both in its style and matter; no one can read it without being struck with the tone of affectionate regard for those to whom it is addressed, which pervades every part of it; and we shall be much surprised if, sooner or later, it does not bear fruit to the Church. Altogether it is much of the same character as the Letter of the Hon. Towry Law, published some months ago, which we have reason to know has been doing good service in that gentleman's old neighbourhood.

*A brief Summary of the Four Books of the Imitation* (Burns and Lambert) will be found a very useful little book for the object intended, viz. to shew "the exact scope of the author in his various instructions, and their connection with one another;" for, as the writer observes, though the work may seem to consist of so many "unconnected sentences," there is in it "a natural though secret order by which the author generally leads the soul from lower to higher degrees of virtue, even to the summit of Christian perfection."

We have only just received the fourth volume of Dr. Murray's *Irish Annual Miscellany* (Bellew, Dublin), and which its author announces is, for the present at least, to be the *concluding* volume. Without committing ourselves to an agreement with all the various opinions, metaphysical or moral, expressed by the talented writer, we are strongly persuaded that good service has been done, and such as is especially needful for the time, by this most laudable, and, speaking generally, most successful endeavour to state salutary and necessary truths, and expose popular fallacies and errors in plain downright language and a sprightly forcible manner. There is a manliness and an honest bluntness about the reverend author's style, which is calculated to arouse attention, where a less trenchant weapon, or one of a finer mould, might fail to strike home, or to make its force felt. One of the essays in the present volume, that on "Equivocation," we would particularly recommend to the attention of every sensible Protestant, whose mind is either free from cant already, or who at least desires to free it from that deleterious influence. The simple fact of the matter is, that in this, as in innumerable other instances, Protestants do without principle what Catholics do on principle. The Protestant is in the universal habit of equivocating, at the same time declaring it to be sinful so to do. He deliberately equivocates, and then sanctimoniously confesses himself guilty of lying. The Catholic, on the other hand,—who holds that a single wilful untruth, though it harms no one, may not be uttered even though (to put an impossible supposition) 10,000 worlds could be saved thereby,—declares explicitly, that in cases which he can specify, at least in principle, equivocation is not merely necessary, as Protestants talk, (as though God could have made it necessary for us, under any circumstances, to do evil), but positively lawful and laudable: upon which the Protestant, who equivocates not only without rule, but against what he calls his moral sense, accuses the Catholic of odious immorality! This looks extremely like what in the case of the Pharisees our Blessed Lord called "hypocrisy."



*Translation of the Divina Commedia.* By the Rev. E. O'Donnell. (Richardson.) "I may say," observes the translator in his advertisement, "without vanity or exaggeration, that no translator has ever done more justice to the author than I have in every respect. . . . A literal translation of the poem is morally impossible; a loose paraphrastic one would completely distort and disfigure the natural beauties of the original. I have therefore observed the *medius terminus* throughout, in order to satisfy all." We are sorry not to be able to class ourselves among the satisfied. But rather than pass a precipitate judgment, or unfavourably bias that of our readers, we prefer leaving them to judge for themselves. In his preface Mr. O'Donnell remarks: "Many have attempted to translate the work in verse, and, in my humble opinion, very unsuccessfully." Cary's is the only such translation we have within reach, and we will give a few quotations as specimens of the comparative fidelity of the two works:

"Tal mi fec' io in quella oscura costa;  
Per che pensando consumai la 'mpresa  
Che fu nel cominciar cotanto tosta."

"Such was my case on approaching this gloomy region, for I accomplished my enterprise merely in imagination, *whereas at the commencement it was forsaken.*"—O'DONNELL.

. . . "E'en such was I on that dun coast,  
Wasting in thought my enterprise, *at first*  
*So eagerly embrac'd.*"—CARY.

"Mentre ch' io rovinava in basso loco."

"Whilst I was rolling down in a low region."—O'DONNELL.

We should premise that the poet is headed back by a furious beast down the hill which he is climbing.

"While to the lower space with backward step  
I fell."—CARY.

"Ripresi via per la piaggia diserta  
Sì che 'l piè fermo sempre era 'l più basso."

"I recommenced my journey through such a desolate region, that I had always to secure my steps with a solid foot."—O'DONNELL.

"I journeyed on over that lonely steep,  
The hinder foot still firmer."

Cary adds as a note, "It is to be remembered, that in ascending a hill the weight of the body rests on the hinder foot."

"Guarda' in alto, e vidi le sue spalle  
Vestite già de' raggi del pianeta,  
Che mena dritto altrui per ogni calle."

"I looked up and saw its sides already covered with the rays of the planet which leads man to all directions."—O'DONNELL.

"I look'd aloft, and saw his shoulders broad  
Already vested with that planet's beam,  
Who leads all wanderers safe through every way."  
CARY.

Another translation from the same publishers is far more successful, and deserves high commendation—*Conferences of the Rev. Père Lacordaire, delivered in the Cathedral of Notre Dame in Paris, translated by Henry Langdon.* This volume is equally creditable to the publisher and the translator. It is nicely printed, handsomely bound, and alto-

gether well "got up," whilst the translator has performed his far more difficult task with singular ability. Père Lacordaire's French does not readily lend itself to translation; Mr. Langdon, however, if we may judge from the first two or three conferences—which alone we have yet had time to examine—has given us a version which combines the merits of fidelity to the original with a fluent, easy, and not ungraceful English. Of the merits of the conferences themselves we need say nothing; the breathless attention of the crowded audiences to which they were delivered is a sufficient guarantee for their value. We will only add, that the present volume contains the conferences on the Church, and on the effects of Catholic doctrine upon the mind, the soul, and human society; and the remaining portion of the dogmatic conferences is promised in another volume.

There is yet a third volume of translations upon our table—*Miscellaneous Translations*, by J. S. Moorat. (Burns and Lambert.) This volume consists of translations, confessedly *free*, from Metastasio and Lamartine. There is only one specimen from the former—*The Death of Abel*; and three-fourths of the volume are devoted to more fragmentary pieces from Lamartine. The former is, to our taste, both more interesting in itself and better executed by the translator; so that we should have been glad if the proportions from the two authors had been reversed. We have no right, however, to quarrel with the translator for indulging his own taste rather than ours; and the modesty of his preface entirely disarms criticism. "These translations," he says, "were not made with any intention of publicity; but copies having been requested by several persons of the translator's private circle, and the idea suggested that the little production might be interesting to many, it is thus modestly offered to those to whom it may be acceptable;" and we have no doubt that there are many to whom it *will* be acceptable.

Messrs. Burns and Lambert have just issued an enlarged *List of Books suitable for Lending-Libraries, School-Prizes, &c.*, which will be found very useful, especially at special seasons like this, and can be forwarded by post to all applicants for a mere trifle.

To such of our readers as are not already aware of the fact, we need only announce the reprint from the *Dublin Review* of two articles from the pen of His Eminence Cardinal Wiseman; the one, as solid in matter as it is brilliant in execution, on "*The Bible in Maynooth*;" the other on "*Convents*" (London, Richardson), being a crushing and most conclusive reply to the scurrilous falsehoods and misrepresentations of Mr. Hobart Seymour. The really "truth-seeking" portion of the Protestant public have now an opportunity of testing the arguments and the facts (?) alleged by No-Popery orators, whether in the House or out, on the two subjects which have been so much agitated of late in the politico-religious world.

*The Life of S. Francis of Assisi; with an Essay on the Characteristics of the Lives of the Saints.* By the Very Rev. F. W. Faber. (Richardson.) That the Essay prefixed to this volume is by a master-hand will be evident to any competent reader who peruses but a couple of pages taken at random. There is a charm of freshness and originality, as the most matter-of-fact person must acknowledge, about all F. Faber's writings; but nothing that we have hitherto received from his pen is, in our judgment, comparable in interest as in power with this most remarkable production; nothing which so strikingly exhibits the mental grasp and peculiar genius of this gifted priest. We will not call the



present Essay fascinating, though fascinating it undoubtedly is in the very highest degree, lest we should seem to speak but of its power to engage and enthral the mind: we say emphatically that it is a work to study, to read again and again, and to meditate upon, till its principles and the solid lessons it conveys have been so wrought into the spiritual part of our nature, that they influence not only our conceptions of the Saints of God and their supernatural lives, but our own daily habitual intercourse with the Church triumphant and the unseen world. All spiritual writers, as is known, strongly insist on the necessity of a continual reading of the Lives of Saints for those who would advance ever so short a distance on the road of perfection. The Essay before us teaches *how* those Lives are to be read worthily and with profit; and with all the earnestness we are capable of expressing we would urge our readers, not merely to read, but to ponder it. It is not only an instructive—it is an eminently suggestive book; and we question whether any one could peruse it once without returning to it again and again, as to a mine of rich and varied thought on a subject than which there is none more worthy in every way of the serious attention of mankind. We may add, that the Essay not only contains very valuable lessons of a practical kind, but by means of the line of argument it adopts, and the peculiar information it affords, is admirably calculated to obviate the objections and remove the difficulties which are felt by some minds to lie in the way of their understanding, or rightly appreciating and heartily sympathising with, those marvellous creations of Divine grace, the Saints of holy Church.

A still later volume of this series, *The Life of the Blessed Paul of the Cross*, will be specially interesting to English readers, Blessed Paul having been the founder of the Passionist Order, now happily established in more than one diocese in this country. The approaching solemnity of his public beatification gives the work an additional interest. So also does the fact, that the author of the present life, Monsignor Strambi, himself died in the odour of sanctity.

A want long felt by choir-masters and singers is at length supplied in *A Collection of Music suitable for the Rite of Benediction* (Burns and Lambert), edited by Dr. Newsham, with the assistance of Mr. Richardson of Liverpool. The collection includes pieces for the *O Salutaris*, the *Tantum Ergo*, and the Litany B.V.M., by various writers, none of them (so far as we are aware) hitherto published, with the exception of Webbe's unequalled *Tantum Ergo* and *O Salutaris*. There is a considerable variety in the styles of the pieces given, and, of course, all are not of equal merit; but as a whole the selection is excellent. Nothing is admitted that is unfit for choral singing, and nothing that is either artistically or religiously objectionable. We recommend it to all Catholic choirs; taking the liberty to add one hint—that they do not give their congregations *too* large a variety of tunes out of the abundant materials here at hand.

The Editors of *The Choir* (Burns and Lambert), having completed their first volume, are wisely intending to confine their second volume to Mass music adapted to choirs of limited powers. The object they aim at is a most important one, and we cannot too sincerely wish them success.

# The Rambler.

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## PART LXV.

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### CONTENTS.

	PAGE
CHARITABLE TRUSTS, ANCIENT AND MODERN . . .	349
LIFE OF RICHARD CREAGH, ARCHBISHOP OF ARMAGH . .	366
MADELEINE, THE ROSIÈRE. Chapters VI., VII. . .	380
REVIEWS.—PROTESTANTISM AND SOCIALISM. Du Protestan- tisme et de toutes les Hérésies, dans leur rapport avec le Socialisme: précédé de l'Examen d'un Ecrit de M. Guizot: par M. Auguste Nicolas . . .	390
OUR ANTIPODES.—Our Antipodes; or, Residence and Ram- bles in the Australasian Colonies, with a Glimpse of the Gold-Fields. By Lieut.-Col. G. C. Mundy . . .	410
PROTESTANT ROSARIES.—Rosaries, compiled for the use of the English Church . . . . .	427
SHORT NOTICES.—The Dublin Review.—Peach's Practical Reflections.—Rev. J. Appleton's Analysis; or, Familiar Explanation of the Gospels for all Sundays and Festi- vals.—St. Francis de Sales' Treatise on the Love of God.—The Clifton Tracts.—Lazarine; or, Duty once understood, religiously fulfilled.—De Ponte's Medita- tions.—Dr. Crookall's Mass in E-flat.—The Catholic School, vol. ii.—Joe Baker; or, the One Church.— Sanctity the only True Greatness, by the Very Rev. F. Oakeley . . . . .	435
POETRY . . . . .	439
ECCLESIASTICAL REGISTER.—Death of the Right Rev. Domingo de Silos Morano, O.S.B. Bishop of Cadiz . . .	441



### To Correspondents.

Correspondents who require answers in private are requested to send their complete address, a precaution not always observed.

We cannot undertake to return rejected communications.

All communications must be *postpaid*. Communications respecting *Advertisements* must be addressed to the publishers, Messrs. BURNS and LAMBERT; but communications intended for the Editor himself should be addressed to the care of Mr. READER, 9 Park Street, Bristol.